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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses reforms and measures targeted at the function of state 
legislatures, and argues how such reforms often have unanticipated impacts. This topic 
was chosen because as reforms and limitations such as the ones outlined here are 
considered for state legislatures in the future, it is important to beter understand how 
similar measures levied in the past have hindered or benefited state legislatures. Chapter 
One analyzes term limits on state legislatures and how this has afected the balance of 
power between state legislatures and governors. Chapter Two studies the 17th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, looking at how curent state legislators feel their 
function and relation to constituents might have been limited with its ratification. Chapter 
Three examines the modern age of balot measures, and how they might inhibit the role 
of state legislatures. Chapter One determined that term limits do create a shift in 
legislative capabilities and function away from state legislatures and towards governors. 
It does not however appear to impact a states economy in any discernable manner. 
Chapter Two concluded that the 17th Amendment inadvertently creates a safeguard for 
state legislatures to operate without the influence of special interests resembling that on 
the Federal level. And Chapter Three determined that balot measures place considerable 
legislative control in the hands of a citizenry that is often unfamiliar with the far-reaching 
impact such proposals can have. Additionaly, such proposals often create policies that 
state legislatures must contend with and address in subsequent legislative sessions. This 
research is important because it shows how reforms and measures placed on state 
legislatures can have unforeseen results that are often harmful to the legislative 
representation of a state’s citizens. This thesis portfolio makes a contribution by 
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ilustrating how such reforms must be studied thoroughly prior to their implementation 
and throughout their use, and could beter inform legislators and constituents as they 
consider such alterations to their state legislatures. 
Reviewers: Professor Dale Medearis 
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Portfolio Introduction 
State legislatures operate within a sphere of limitations. Limited time to meet, 
limited resources at their disposal, low salaries and restrictive rules compound the already 
complicated task of being a productive legislature. Additionaly, legislatures must 
struggle with the same type of polarizing politics and partisan bickering that plagues the 
U.S. Congress. Issues like gerymandering, heated debates over social issues and state 
campaign finance regulations among others have taken the place of rampant coruption 
alegations that plagued state legislatures in the late 19th to early 20th century, and 
continued the century old withdrawal exhibited between state populations and their state 
legislatures. 
Arizona Senate Bil 1062 is an example of this disconnect between constituents 
and representatives. This state legislation received a great deal of national atention in 
early 2014 for the potential impact in alowing businesses in Arizona to use the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act as a defense for a refusal of service or discrimination because 
of someone’s sexual orientation or religious beliefs.1 The bil passed the Arizona 
Republican-controled Senate on February 19, 2014, and the Arizona House on February 
20th. The vote in both houses was down party lines, and immediately received much 
public criticism from both Republican and Democrat constituents across Arizona. In the 
end Governor Jan Brewer, who is known for her extremely conservative stance on social 
issues, vetoed the bil, caling it a “broadly worded bil that could result in unintended 
and negative consequences.”2 The bil’s Republican opposition included both of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Cindy Carcamo, “Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes So-Caled Anti-Gay Bil,” LA Times, February 26, 2014, 
htp:/articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/26/nation/la-na-nn-arizona-gay-brewer-20140226. 
2 Catherine E. Schoichet, Halimah Abdulah, “Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer vetoes controversial anti-gay bil, SB 1062,” 
CNN Politics, February 26, 2014, htp:/www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bil/. 
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Arizona’s Republican U.S. Senators, John McCain and Jef Flake, and former 
presidential candidate Mit Romney.3 Former Arizona Governor, Janet Napolitano 
explained that had the bil come across her desk she too would have utilized the veto, 
saying, “In my view knowing the state as wel as I do, it just doesn’t represent what 
Arizona is. And it’s just an example, once again, of the state legislature being out of 
touch with the state, overal.”4 
Similar scenarios have created an extensive list of claims throughout history 
describing state legislatures as detached and aloof to the priorities of their constituencies, 
essentialy incapable of reflecting the wil of the people who elected them in the first 
place. There have been several atempts by the people and various levels of government 
to counter those sentiments. Through various movements, reforms and legislation, 
measures have been implemented to limit the authority and coruption of state 
legislatures while increasing the authority, and in many cases direct representation 
controled by the people of each state.  
Diferent Types of Legislatures 
The fifty state legislatures across the United Sates are made up of 7,383 elected 
representatives who craft policies, write legislation and perform a wide aray of other 
activities on behalf of the constituencies that elected them.5 Congressional scholars vary 
in their exact descriptions of the responsibilities and duties of state legislatures, but they 
generaly include representation, lawmaking, appropriations/budgeting, public education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Carcamo, “Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes So-Caled Anti-Gay Bil.” 
4 Mike Levine, “Ex-Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano: State’s Legislature ‘Out of Touch,’” ABC News, February 26, 
2014, htp:/abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/02/ex-arizona-gov-janet-napolitano-states-legislature-out-of-touch/ 
5 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years,” 2013, 
htp:/www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-and-length-of-terms.aspx.	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and serving as a check and balance to the executive branch.6 The capacity of each 
legislator to achieve these objectives can vary depending on a state’s particular type of 
legislature. Being a state legislator does not necessarily translate into a ful-time job, and 
in many situations is far from it. 
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) groups legislatures into 
three categories based on whether they function as a ful or part-time legislature. The first 
type is Green legislatures. These are essentialy ful-time legislatures, whose 
representatives are wel paid and treat the position as their only job. For example, New 
York state legislators have a base salary of approximately $79,500.7 Legislators in these 
states have much larger populations in their districts, and have larger staffs who work on 
legislative and constituent issues. Their legislative sessions are much longer and resemble 
the operation of the U.S. Congress much more than other states. California, New York 
and Pennsylvania al qualify as Green legislatures.8 
The next classification is Gray legislatures, or hybrids. These bodies generaly 
spend half to two-thirds of a session convened. Members have considerably smaler 
salaries and usualy have other sources of income to make a living. Their stafs are also 
defined as medium in size, when compared to al state legislatures.9 The North Carolina 
General Assembly is an example of a Gray legislature. Their curent session was 
convened in January 2013 and wil conclude in December 2014. The General Assembly 
meets during that period in two forms of session. The first is the regular or long session, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thomas H. Litle, David B. Ogle, “The Legislative Branch of State Government: People, Process, and Politics,” ABC-
CLIO, 2006, Pg. 36.  
7 Danny Hakim, “New York Legislators Pushing to Raise Their Pay,” The New York Times, February 10, 2008, 
htp:/www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/nyregion/10raise.html. 
8 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Ful-And Part-Time Legislatures,” 2009, 
htp:/www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/ful-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx 
9 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Ful-And Part-Time Legislatures.”	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which begins in January when the session was convened and typicaly lasts for 6 months. 
The second session is refered to as the short session, and usualy meets the second year 
of the session for six weeks.10 Members of the North Carolina General Assembly receive 
an annual salary of $13,951.11 
Figure 1 - Ful-Time, Hybrid and Part-Time Legislatures12 
 
The third group is refered to as Gold legislatures. These legislators receive litle 
compensation for their work in their state’s congress, almost assuredly having another 
source of income. Scholars refer to these representatives as traditional or citizen 
legislatures, representing their districts for a short period of time and then returning to 
their communities and regular professions. These types of legislatures are most often 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 North Carolina General Assembly, “When is the General Assembly in Session?” 
htp:/www.ncleg.net/gascripts/Help/KnowledgeBase/viewItem.pl?nID=35 
11 North Carolina General Assembly, “How Much Do Legislators Get Paid?” 
htp:/www.ncleg.net/ncgainfo/educational/funfacts/legpay.html. 
12 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Ful-And Part-Time Legislatures.”	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found in rural states with smal populations and have considerably smaler stafs.13 Utah 
for example, has a constitutional mandate that limits their annual General Session 
meetings to only forty-five calendar days.14 Utah’s legislators are also only paid around 
$130 per day in salary.15 
It is important to note that even within these three classifications of legislatures, 
between states there can be considerable discrepancies in session lengths, legislator 
compensation, and staf size. Nebraska does not even have a bicameral legislature with a 
Senate and House like the other forty-nine states. Their legislature is unicameral, meeting 
for ninety working days in odd-numbered years and sixty working days in even-
numbered years.16 However, state representatives experience a much diferent type of 
afiliation with their constituents than their federal counterparts. They spend much more 
time in their home districts when compared with members of the U.S. Congress, and can 
create closer relationship with the individuals they represent. They are also in a constant 
cycle of reelection, with most state House terms being two years, and State Senates being 
either two or four.17 While each of the fifty legislatures are considerably diferent in 
appearance, many of the issues and debates that have come through their chambers 
throughout history are similar, especialy in terms of political partisanship and failure to 
enact changes and claims of coruption. These similarities have led to reforms and 
measures being enacted which have changed the function of state legislatures across the 
nation and have launched similar cals for change on the federal level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Ful-And Part-Time Legislatures.” 
14 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Legislative Session Length,” htp:/www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx 
15 Bob Bernick Jr., “7.7% Pay Hike is Pushed for Utah’s Legislators,” Deseret News, November 9, 2007, 
htp:/www.deseretnews.com/article/695226164/77-pay-hike-is-pushed-for-Utahs-legislators.html?pg=al. 
16 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Legislative Session Length,” 
17 National Conference of State Legislatures, “Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years.”	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This thesis wil examine three such reforms, and their impact on state legislatures. 
The overal goal of this research wil be to explore whether these changes have resulted 
in the desired efect or whether they have negatively impacted the role and function of 
state legislatures. While changes to assemblies, representation or other maters may, on 
the surface, appear to fix one issue, this study wil examine if by altering how state 
governments operate they potentialy are doing greater harm than good. The conclusion 
wil summarize the findings of al three chapters, identify any similarities or diferences 
that exist, and make recommendations for how such movements should be approached 
and dealt with by legislatures and the citizenry. 
Chapter One – The Influence of Term Limits on States’ Executive-Legislative 
Relationship 
 
The first chapter examines term limit’s efects on state legislators, with a 
heightened focus on how they afect a state governor’s legislative impact. The question 
being addressed asks: Do term limits on state legislators have an efect on the balance of 
power between governors and legislatures, and does this afect these state’s economies? 
Term limits rose in popularity in the early 1990s, as a major citizen-led efort to address 
rampant incumbency in state legislatures across the United States. While existing 
research focuses on their impact on state legislatures as a whole, there is litle atention 
given on how they actualy increase the state’s executive branch’s authority, and what 
impact that could have on a specific state’s wel-being.  
 This study draws upon previous research to highlight the clear decline in 
experience and political influence that state representatives have on the legislative 
process when compared to their governor, essentialy eliminating a balanced form of state 
level government. Term limits prevent legislators from gaining the institutional 
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knowledge necessary to reach the same leadership capacity as their counterparts in states 
without them. This paper identifies this as creating a vulnerability for legislators, making 
them much more reliant on professional stafers and lobbyists, and giving executive 
stafers a clear advantage in pushing for certain legislative policies.  
This chapter also looks at the fifteen states that curently have term limits, and 
analyzes their economic development to see if any potential fluctuations have resulted 
because of term limits. It is hypothesized that with governors having more control over 
the legislative process, a variation in economic development of some type should be 
shown at the point in time when term limits were enacted. The budget process for 
example, could ilustrate governors influencing legislatures to enact proposals that difer 
considerably from trends in the years prior to term limits. This diference would be 
ilustrated in economic indicators including unemployment and state population growth. 
The same could be seen when examining a state without term limits to a demographicaly 
similar one that does. This comparison wil ilustrate the various impacts term limits have 
on numerous components of an economy, versus how they would appear had the term 
limits not been implemented. 
Chapter Two –Efect of the 17th Amendment on State Legislatures 
 Chapter two shifts focus to the 17th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This 
measure, implemented in 1913, mandated that al U.S. senators be elected by a popular 
vote. Prior to the amendment however, state legislatures were tasked with electing their 
federal representatives to the U.S. Senate.18 This chapter answers the question: How do 
curent state legislators view the 17th Amendment and the modern debate over its reform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 National Archives, “17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Direct Election of U.S. Senators,” 
htp:/www.archives.gov/legislative/features/17th-amendment/. 
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or repeal? Implemented as a way to prevent individuals from essentialy bribing their way 
to the U.S. Senate and the inefectiveness of state legislatures in filing vacancies, the 17th 
Amendment removed a great deal of control and federal power away from state 
legislatures. This research atempts to see if this hurts the amount of involvement had by 
the citizenry with their state legislatures in anyway. The hypothesis of this section is that 
the removal of this authority has greatly hindered the role of state legislators, essentialy 
removing their influence on policy at the federal level. This power limitation is likely to 
have had a negative influence on the atentiveness people exhibit toward their state 
legislatures, and in the opinions of state legislators with regards to their function. 
 Interviews conducted in this research with curent members of state legislatures 
alow for a more modern view of the 17th Amendment, and how it is perceived by those it 
limits a century later. These conversations have helped to develop a realization of how 
the 17th Amendment is often viewed today as a bufer between heightened special interest 
groups and campaign finance issues and state legislators. Many state representatives feel 
this alows them to avoid many obstructive aspects of national, politics alowing for 
beter or worse, things to actualy get done on the state level. These interviews reveal 
how both Democrats and Republicans in state legislators are generaly united in their 
view of the 17th Amendment.  
This paper builds upon previous research to further the understanding of how 
curent political figures on al levels of government perceive the amendment and its 
impact. This analysis wil also highlight diferences of opinion that might exist between 
federal and state legislators and political figures. It wil emphasize variations between 
those it directly afects, and others who might advocate reform or changes for solely 
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political purposes. This research reveals that the only individuals who adamantly support 
overturning the Amendment are those on the extreme right of the political spectrum. 
These individuals view the 17th Amendment as a way to increase the likelihood that the 
U.S. Senate resembles traditionaly conservative state legislatures. 
Chapter Three – The Impact of Initiatives and Referendums on State Legislatures 
 The final chapter examines the evolution of balot initiatives and referendums 
over time and their relationship with state legislatures in the modern era. The research in 
this section answers the question: Do balot initiatives and referendums hurt or inhibit the 
role of state legislatures? Much of the prior information on balot initiatives and their 
interesting history in the states establishes two distinct fields of opinion on the mater. 
The first views the modern use of balot measures as a lucrative political industry by 
which the needs of special or corporate interests can easily be promoted and instituted as 
law without the approval of state legislatures. This group also views the measures as a 
tool, utilizing the public who may not have a solid understanding of the various maters at 
hand. The second field of thought reveals initiatives and referendums as a means to 
circumvent the inefectiveness and hesitancy exhibited by modern state legislatures. 
Those of this opinion regard the process as it was in the Progressive era, a means to much 
needed political reform against a legislative body incapable of making necessary changes. 
However, it could be argued that in its modern form, balot measures have to deal much 
more with deadlock over partisan politics, rather than atempts to keep a specific status 
quo that existed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 Chapter three builds upon previous research and examination of numerous balot 
initiatives and referendums to conclude that the role of money in balot measures has not 
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changed over time. The initiative industry seems to be much more impacted by the 
vulnerability of the voting public to act upon opinionated views and strong rhetoric, 
rather than seek out facts. This has led to a point at which state legislatures must contend 
with the impact of balot measures on policy issues unforeseen by the citizenry who voted 
for the measures. This has been the case with multiple states across the nation, where 
balot measures have crippled state budgets, overtaxed businesses, and limited 
individuals’ access to things like healthcare benefits. Furthermore, the research concludes 
that balot measures create a path via referendums to circumvent a system of check and 
government oversight, by going straight to a public who can be persuaded rather than a 
governor’s desk for a signature or veto.  
 Chapter three also ilustrates how balot measures waste limited time and 
resources of state legislatures. An interview with Missouri State Representative Stephen 
Webber helps explain the aftermath of such balot measures once they go into efect, and 
steps that, in order to alter their impact, must be taken both during the curent and 
subsequent legislative session. Not only does it appear that balot measures intervene in 
the role of state legislatures by impacting their capability to enact policies, they also 
appear to produce additional policy elements that would otherwise not be problematic.  
Summary 
This thesis contends that while reforms such as these do not always negatively 
impact state legislatures, in some cases the efect can be harmful to a legislature’s ability 
to efectively cary out their job. Some movements, while limiting the authority and 
power of state legislatures, do alow them to more efectively translate the wishes and 
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needs of the people into public policy.19 Reforms and policy changes similar to term 
limits, the 17th Amendment, and balot measures need to be carefuly studied both prior to 
their implementation, and throughout their existence. Changes in ideology, technology 
and other functions of government can influence the efectiveness of such measures, 
ultimately limiting the ability of state legislators to represent the interests of their 
constituents. As hinted at by Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, limiting the function 















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Todd Donovan, Christopher Mooney, Daniel Smith, “State and Local Politics.” Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011, 
Pg. 230.  
20 Thomas E. Mann, Norman J. Ornstein, “It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System 
Colided With the New Politics of Extremism,” Basic Books, 2012, Pg. 126.	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Chapter 1 





This paper wil explore and examine the question: Do term limits on state legislators have 
an efect on the balance of power between governors and legislatures, and does this affect 
these states’ economies? Research within this study wil consist of an historical analysis 
of bils and legislation submited and passed by these states’ legislative bodies, as wel as 
data on economic information pertaining to the development of both term-limited states 
and those without term limits This study wil examine the impact of term limits by 
evaluating how states with term-limited legislatures compare to themselves prior to their 
implementation and to other states with similar demographic features (i.e. population, 
income, education, racial makeup). After examining the role that term limits play on the 
relationship that exists between legislatures and governors, this paper wil examine any 
corelation between a stronger executive branch and any economic changes these states’ 
experience. It is hypothesized that term limits place state legislatures at a disadvantage 
with respect to gubernatorial authority and experience, and this leads to negative 
economic consequences within the state. 
Term Limits in U.S. State Legislatures 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the United States saw a major citizen-led efort to 
combat what had become known as “Congressional Homesteading.” This trend consisted 
of members from state legislatures and the United States Congress winning re-election 
efortlessly. An efort labeled the Term-Limits Movement developed, in which citizen 
initiatives and referendums concerning term limits were forced upon their state 
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legislatures.21 As a result of this movement, which some argue was “the most significant 
state legislative reform movement in a generation,” twenty-one states adopted term limits 
for their legislatures.22 Six of those states’ term limits were later struck down by state 
Table 1 - State Legislative Term Limits23 
 
legislatures or state supreme courts, leaving fifteen states curently that retain term limits 
for their legislators.24 The balot measures in these states received overwhelming support 
from the voting public, as seen in column four of Table 1. Today term limits remain 
popular, with a recent Galup pol from January 2013 showing that 75% of the general 
public even support term limits on federal lawmakers.25 
There is limited existing research into the power shifts that may occur on the 
influence of governors and their administration over term-limited legislatures. Studies of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Todd Donovan, Christopher Mooney, Daniel Smith, “State and Local Politics,” Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011. 
Pg. 241 
22 Donovan, “State and Local Politics.” Pg. 240 
23 National Conference of State Legislatures, “The Term Limited States.” January 2013, 
htp:/www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legisdata/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx 
24 Donovan, “State and Local Politics.” Pg. 240 
25 Lydia Saad, Galup Politics, “Americans Cal for Term Limits, End to Electoral Colege.” January 18, 2013, 
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term limits tend to focus on their corelation to state finances, congressional leadership, 
the quality of candidates seeking ofice and the overwhelming support for term limits in 
public opinion. Some of the most extensive research to date on executive-legislative 
relations has been conducted by Richard J. Powel in the publication Institutional Change 
in American Politics: The Case of Term Limits. The author draws from the desertion of 
seniority and leadership, as wel as the long-term relationships developed between both 
legislators and lobbyists, to ilustrate the key finding that consequences in the balance of 
governmental power are creating shifts within these term-limited legislative cultures.26 
This paper seeks to build upon the research of Powel and others. Powel 
acknowledges that because the legislature is the legislative voice of the people and the 
most open and accessible through smal, regional districts, term limits grant constituents 
less ability to influence the outcome of decisions on policy issues.27 The ability to 
efectively oversee and potentialy check the operations of the executive branch is 
reduced by term limits because of the reduction of experienced members in the 
legislature. More research is needed to delve into the amount and types of legislation 
passed through term-limited legislatures that were heavily favored and supported by 
governors’ administration compared to legislation that was opposed. This conclusion 
needs to then be folowed up by an examination into data and evidence drawn from 
economic development in states to see if there are any potential fluctuations or anomalies 
that having a stronger governor may be causing. 
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Previous Research on Term Limits 
The existing literature on term limits revolves around the concepts of spending 
and state debt, the impacts they have on candidacy decisions for chalengers in both state 
and congressional elections, and how state legislatures are evolving in response to 
legislators’ limited time in ofice. In one of the most explanatory scholarly works on term 
limits, Political Scientists Jonathan Day and Keith Boeckelman examine the efects that 
term limits have on state spending trends. They analyze the impact of changes in the 
composition, institutional dynamics and behavior of legislatures after term limits take 
effect.28 They argue that one of the initial goals of the Term-Limits Movement was to 
reduce government spending by appealing to “citizen-legislators” to lead their states for a 
limited period of time.29 The Terms Limit Movement brought with it hope that this new 
type of citizen-legislator would bring with them the capacity to slash budgets and reduce 
debts, resulting in the opposite of what many term limit supporters saw as legislative 
insiders spending to stay in ofice term after term.30 Their results however, clearly show 
an increase in spending after the implementation of term limits accompanied by a sharp 
lack of new revenue. Day and Boeckelman argue that these increasing debt trends are 
indicative of ineptitude to manage finances efectively. Politicians seeking term-limited 
seats know they have a limited amount of time to promote themselves, until they are 
forced to either leave or seek another ofice. Because of these trends, as pointed out by 
Day and Boeckelman, it has become common for politicians to lower taxes and increase 
spending during their terms to increase their public approval before leaving ofice. 
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Further, by examining past research, Day and Boeckelman also determine what 
types of candidates are atracted to serve in legislative bodies with term limits.31 They 
tend to be legislators who are ambitious and more inclined to seek higher ofice than 
those in states without term limits. Day and Boeckelman determine these ambitions 
generaly incentivize legislators to increase spending and keep taxes low while in 
ofice.32 This increases their appeal among voters when the opportunity to seek higher 
ofice presents itself. The authors use this study to lobby against national term limits as a 
solution for the federal budget and debt crisis. Term limits, they conclude, are an 
inefective type of procedural reform that does not resolve the problem of high state debt. 
Another influential examination of term limits observes the impact that state term 
limits have on elections. Political Scientists Nathaniel Birkhead, Gabriel Uriarte and 
Wiliam Bianco test the efect of term limits on the quality of candidates who eventualy 
chalenge incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives in The Impact of State 
Legislative Term Limits on the Competitiveness of Congressional Elections. It is 
concluded that “termed-out” state legislators who stil wish to hold ofice wil run in 
congressional primaries, often detering other qualified and electable candidates from 
running, in part to not face dificult primaries before the general election.33 Their study 
shows that placing term limits on state representatives can generate a “substitution efect” 
and increase the likelihood that state legislators wil run for the U.S. House. The study 
argues that proponents of term limits corectly assume that limits increase the number of 
politicaly experienced potential chalengers for congressional elections.34 In many 
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situations where Congressional incumbents enjoy safe districts, they are finding 
themselves being chalenged by state legislators who are forced from ofice with no other 
place to go. 
Many scholarly works on the issue of state term limits acknowledge that they 
have remained very popular with voters. The grassroots organization U.S. Term Limits 
reports that, in the fifteen states where term limits are in place, voters were 
overwhelmingly in support of the referendums. In fact, the average vote was 67% to 
approve.35 A 2002 article by The Council of State Governments, Term Limits Produce 
Changes, recognizes that states must adapt to these constituent-driven term limits. They 
state: 
While some legislators and other interested parties are trying to revise term limits, 
others are trying to change the way they conduct their business to reflect the new 
paradigm. Legislators in term-limited States are adjusting their behaviors. Both 
the efects of term limits and the responses vary, as so legislative culture and 
organization in each State.36 
 
The study also acknowledges that legislators must create a new model of governance 
centered on recruiting and training potential candidates. Idealy, this would generate a 
pool of candidates with experience and skils garnered in the private sector and other 
local government ofices, resulting in potential candidates who previously may not have 
had the opportunity to impact state legislatures. At the time of the article, California 
Assembly Speaker Robert M. Hertzberg was quoted as saying, “Given the interaction 
between State and local government on a wide range of issues, many freshmen join the 
Assembly with direct experience with – and with valuable perspectives in – the pressing 
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policy issues of the day.”37 The article also acknowledges how new members and their 
stafs are familiarizing themselves with legislative/policy procedures and constituent 
service at a faster rate to compensate for their limited time in ofice. This has prompted 
states to ofer seminars and comprehensive training programs from academic institutions, 
state agencies and special-interest groups aimed at quickly educating lawmakers much 
more intensively because of term limits.38 This also means that the window that 
legislators have to advance their agendas is dramaticaly shortened. To counter this, many 
legislatures have modified legislative schedules, commitee structures and chamber rules 
to improve the ability of members to address policy issues.39 For example, the Ohio 
House majority is holding more legislative caucus meetings to alow members to improve 
their comprehension of complex issues.40 The Council of State Governments 
demonstrates that states, with proper training, wil be able to counter the inexperience 
factor those opposed to state term limits fear new members wil encounter. 
Existing research rarely examines the dynamics that term limits create between 
the legislative body elected to represent very smal districts and that of the state’s chief 
executive, the governor. State legislatures and governors need one another to promote 
desired policy goals. One branch cannot pass bils or advance policy goals without the 
other. However, as Political Scientist Thad Kousser points out, “Neither branch can 
compel the other’s cooperation, the performance of its major functions depends on its 
ability to bargain successfuly.”41 Do term limits on state legislators empower governors, 
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thirty-six of whom have term limits themselves, and gubernatorial candidates unfairly, 
giving them clear advantages over inexperienced legislative representatives?  
In states with term limits, there exists a disproportion in bargaining and influence 
between governors and legislatures. This disproportion depends on several other 
variables as wel, including how gubernatorial term limits afect this relationship. This 
relationship between supposed equal branches of state governments indicate that there is 
a possibility that a shift may be occuring in some situations where legislative term limits 
(and possibly gubernatorial limits) are not being conducted with a fair system of checks 
and balances; leaving one branch at clear disadvantage. 
As previously indicated, most existing research on state term limits revolves 
around the same apprehensions. Certainly most fal short of comparing that additional 
information to how it relates to gubernatorial term limits. These existing theories and 
shortcomings motivate research that wil idealy indicate whether or not branches that 
should be fair and balanced are faling short of that goal, and if there are inadvertent 
economic efects. 
Extensive data on term limits have been colected to examine the issue by the 
Joint Project on Term Limits (JPTL), a colective analysis that was conducted by the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments the State 
Legislative Leaders Foundations and various legislative scholars. The project was 
conducted between July 2001 and December 2004, examining the eight states that had 
term limits at the time.42 The study includes a national survey of al state legislatures, 
which provides data and information to conduct comparisons between term limited and 
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non-term limited legislatures, as wel as the atitudes and opinions of term limits and its 
efects on their states, the strength of the executive branch, and their overal job 
performance since the change. The case studies and research provide many interesting 
insights into the issue of term limits and how it varies among the states. The study is 
limited by its age, as new states have been impacted by term limits, and some that were 
influenced by them at the time have since been repealed, but it does provide the necessary 
information for examining the executive-legislative relationship and its efect on 
economic development. 
Evidence and Methods of Analysis 
 
Analysis of comparable datasets for term-limited states wil examine variations 
that term limits may create between the executive-legislative relationships. This study 
wil not only build upon research previously conducted, but also explore more intensively 
legislative records, commitee reports, hearings and floor debates. Floor debates and 
speeches in particular, wil provide an interesting perspective into the opinions and 
arguments of representatives of term-limited legislatures as they push for bils or 
amendments. In the study Legislating Without Experience: Case Studies in State 
Legislative Term Limits, the authors quote a California legislative staf member who 
highlighted how term limits afect representatives and how easily they can be controled 
by governors: 
On the Budget, members wil be much more interested in their pork after term 
limits, because they don’t have time there to do something tangible on the bigger 
scale. They are much more susceptible to geting picked of with pork.43 
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Research of potential expansions in pork barel funding, or procurement of money for 
“home district projects,” versus years preceding term limits would build upon these 
studies.  
The paper wil then present a comparative case study of states with similar 
constituent identities to provide information on the efects legislative term limits have on 
the executive-legislative relation. A comparison of South Dakota, which has legislative 
term limits, to North Dakota, which does not, wil alow for a comparison of legislation 
passed, levels of pork bareling and budget batles that legislatures encounter with 
executive administrations.  
 This paper uses the term “state legislature” as the generic term for al state-level 
legislative bodies within the United States. Curently, a slight majority of states refer to 
their legislative bodies as “state legislatures,” while the remaining states refer to theirs as 
various types of general assemblies or courts. For research purposes al state legislative 
branches wil be refered to as state legislatures.44 
Results 
 
As Powel points out, the intent of term limits is to address what was thought to 
be a hiccup in the relationship between legislators and their constituents.45 Advocates 
failed to address concerns for the issue of separation of power at the state level for how 
term limits could afect the institutional relationship between legislatures and governors. 
Previous research into term limits clearly indicates that there is a sharp decrease in the 
experience and personal sway that state representatives have on the legislative process in 
their state. It is important to note how these changes directly afect the structure of the 
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internal functions of legislatures by eliminating what had been lucrative incentives to a 
strong balance of inter-branch relations.  
Term limits have led to a situation in which legislators are much more 
persuadable by executive oficials because of a lack of knowledge and expertise in the 
legislative process. Similarly, they also recognize the superior comprehension and 
proficiency that a governor’s staf holds. The change in institutional incentives 
maintained by legislatures is amended under term limits. Shorter legislative careers make 
it less beneficial to pick fights with the executive branch. Those who seek ofice are more 
likely to use it for a launching point for future careers in politics, and the prospect of 
picking a fight with the executive establishment is not appealing to those members. As a 
member of the Arizona Legislature put it, “I’m amazed about how many people here are 
using the ofice as a jumping of point – we have several aspiring congressmen and 
governors.”46 
The constant rotation of term-limited legislators also plays a major role in the 
power shift away from the legislative and towards the executive. The shortened tenure in 
ofice provides less opportunity for members to gain the much needed experience and 
involvement that build strong party leadership within the legislatures. In turn, the quality 
of commitee chairs afects the value of legislation being purposed. This has resulted in 
trends where rank-and-file legislators, as Powel refers to them, have become the norm. 
They are less likely to folow their leadership, whose limited time left in ofice gives 
them ultimately no influence over the long-term career aspirations of their members. The 
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turnover rates under term limits can be dramatic, with as much as half a chamber being 
ineligible to run for reelection in the first year in which their impact is felt.47 
As previously mentioned, the deteriorated significance of commitees and the 
politicians who chair them have greatly reduced the legislature’s power. Traditionaly, 
legislative commitees consisted of members who had prior experience or knowledge on 
issues pertaining to their commitee, resulting in recommendations to which both the 
executive and legislative branches would often adhere. Applying lessons learned from 
prior research to the executive-legislative relationship, the information makes the 
argument that a commitee’s influence depends on two factors. The first is the perception 
that it has an informational advantage in its area of jurisdiction. This entails the notion 
that these commitees are comprised of researchers and lawmakers who contain a 
heightened understanding of the issues at hand and how those issues are intertwined with 
the legislative process. The second issue is the unwriten norms of legislative 
specialization. The loss of legislative experience however, as wel as the institutional 
maintenance of making sure that commitees are stafed with the most knowledgeable 
stafers available, has led to a situation in which commitees and their chairs are no 
longer seen as the beacon of legislative expertise by executive oficials on any given 
issue.48 
Leadership under term limits may arise much faster and for a briefer amount of 
time than before. The tenure of this legislative leadership often does not last longer than 
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two years.49 There has always been a noticeable shift in the method to which members 
rise into these leadership positions. Before term limits, the standards would have included 
serving in some leadership capacity associated with seniority. Now however, they are 
more easily gained by those with elite fundraising abilities or operations. 
Most of these new legislators who achieve leadership under term limits do it near 
the end of their set limits. This puts them in a lame duck phase in which other members 
and the state’s executive branch are much less likely to cooperate with them, even though 
they may have just recently obtained their positions. This results in state legislatures 
comprised of much less party discipline and overal productivity.  
Term limits remove institutional incentives for legislators to compromise and 
ultimately defend their own branch of government. It reduces loyalty to the legislatures 
because they no longer have a long-term stake in its long-term standing.50 Previous 
legislators in these states, who did not have term limits, would have recognized this as a 
lessening of their own individual influences now resulting in a clear erosion of legislative 
authority.51 This is also seen in the oversight functionality of legislatures, in making sure 
that executive oficials are implementing laws in the corect fashion. 
Commitee oversight of executive agencies has become much less enforced and 
authoritarian since the implementation of term limits. This aligns with the previously 
mentioned finding that inexperienced members are more likely to view executive 
members as experts on any given issue, as opposed to their own leadership. This in turn 
afects the ability of a legislative commitee to oversee or chalenge an action or 
implementation of a law by the administration. This builds upon the lessening of 
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legislators’ own influence by highlighting trends in which legislatures are not defending 
prerogatives and laws they implemented by chalenging an executive branch’s action.  
Powel highlighted this decline of oversight by looking at the decrease in the 
number of supplemental budget requests that have been made by the California 
Legislature. Before term limits, the average number of requests was 199. Since term 
limits that number has falen to just 120.52 The number of executive agencies under the 
jurisdiction of such legislative request has falen from 61% to 51%, and there has been a 
clear decrease in the number of legislative requests for reports from the Bureau of State 
Audits. These same trends can be seen in other term-limited states as wel, with the lack 
of oversight functionality being sighted as a clear indication of an imbalance of the 
executive-legislative relationship.53 
In examining evidence and reports on the efect of term limits it is clear they do 
create considerably more influence in favor of the executive administration. It favors 
unelected employees in the executive branch and lobbyists who have both more political 
experience and institutional retention over inexperienced legislatures, and are not directly 
held accountable by constituencies. The intention of term limits was to shift legislative 
power away from “career politicians” towards general citizens, but instead we find that 
limits have shifted extra power to the executive branch. This creates a trend that is not in 
line with the equal mantra of the constitutional system of three branches of government. 
It moves political influence away from those who are elected to have direct sway in 
dealing with the legislative process, in addition to the system of checks and balances in 
place to hold governors and their oficials accountable.  
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Now that it has been established that there is a clear shift in the balance of power 
between these two branches of government, any efects made due to this change need be 
examined; specificaly in regards to changes to these states’ economies. With the 
executive branch less likely to encounter opposition from state legislatures during the law 
making process or via oversight, they have the opportunity to endorse their own 
initiatives without as many objections or alterations as had previously been the case. By 
examining the economies of states with term limits, before and after the limits took 
efect, we can see if there are any situations in which states have encountered a decline in 
economic performance and earnings. In light of the previous acknowledgment that term 
limits do in fact grant more power to the executive branch, this analysis wil alow for the 
comparative examination of whether a stronger governor afects a state’s economy 
diferently than that of a state without term limits. To examine this relationship and any 
change in state spending and growth, this thesis wil set pecuniary parameters based on 
economic indicators that alow for the analysis of these states’ performances. Examining 
indicators, such as population, state bond debt, unemployment rates, among others, wil 
occur within an annual constraint of roughly ten years prior to the year of impact for the 
term limits and as many years from that impact to 2012, taking into consideration how 
recently some of these state’s term limits have gone into efect. 
Population growth indicates that states are introducing legislation and policy that 
make it appealing for both new businesses and residents to either relocate to specific 
areas or feel economicaly strong enough to expand their families. The population growth 
of the fifteen states with term limits do not indicate any significant findings indicating 
that the greater influence of gubernatorial power have afected them. At their years of 
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impact outlined in Table 1, the states al continue the same steady growth pertaining to 
population, as they were experiencing prior to the change (see Table 2). Louisiana, which 
experiences the greatest abnormality in population decrease due to Huricane Katrina in 
2005, shows a rebound in growth around their year of impact, 2007. This resulted in 
them regaining a positive increase similar to what they were experiencing prior to 2005. 
Michigan is the only state that experiences any type of steady decline after their year of 
impact, 1998. It begins in 2006 at 10.0361 milion and balances out from 2011 and 2012 
around 9.877 milion residents. While this decline could have been afected by the 
Michigan Legislature beginning to feel the efects of proposed budgets, which are 
submited annualy through Michigan’s State Budget Ofice, and the Michigan 
Governor’s ability to have line-item veto for appropriation bils (which could see 
decreased opposition due to term limits), it was most likely caused by the Great 
Recession.54 This had a major implication on industrial states, like Michigan, whose 
economies are heavily dependent on automobile manufacturing. Michigan’s steadiness 
and slight resurgence of population growth in the 2010-2012 timeframe indicates as 
much.	  	  
States often utilize bond financing as a type of long-term borowing to raise 
revenue. A rise in state bond debt is usualy associated with a major project related to 
public infrastructure renovations. Term-limited states do experience sporadic levels of 
state bond debt issued, but they are not disproportionate when compared to states without 
term limits. California and Florida serve as the most intermitent trend over their period 
of observation with California issuing $2.5686 bilion from 2008-2009 alone. This drastic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Michigan Department of Technology, Management and Budget, “Budget Process,” 
htp:/www.michigan.gov/budget/0,4538,7-157-11462-34950--,00.html (accessed March 3, 2013).  
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Table 2 - State Population 
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Table 3 - Bond Debt Issued (Amount in Dolars) 
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Table 4 - State Bond Debt	  Outstanding	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alocation can be atributed to the 2008-2012 California budget crisis, in which California 
faced major budget shortfals due to declining revenue. When compared to Texas without 
term limits (which leapt close to $7 bilion from 2006-2008), it is clear that term limits 
and extra gubernatorial power do not generate any type of unusual issuance of state bond 
debt (see Table 3). The same can be said for measurements of bond debt outstanding. Al 
term limit case studies indicate there is not uniform progression in trends starting at their 
year of impact or in the subsequent years. States like Florida, California, Maine, 
Michigan, Missouri, and Arizona see steady growth in their outstanding state bond debt, 
while Colorado, Arkansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Nevada experience more 
bel-curve like trends during their examination periods; al corelating with global 
economic decline trends or idiosyncratic events that occured within those states. South 
Dakota and Nebraska did not issue any bond debt (See Table 4). As previously 
mentioned state bonds are issued for a number of program-oriented issues. The 
Oklahoma State Government website describes state bond debt’s purpose as being for 
“essential infrastructure maintenance, renovation, and new construction, as wel as 
equipment upgrades.  Program purposes include reduced cost loans for housing, 
education, and water development/treatment.” 55 Previous research would suggest that if 
governors with increased power over legislatures who seem eager to provide more 
revenue with lower taxes should result in an increase in state bond debts for these states 
in order to finance infrastructure projects. The lack of such a trend indicates that stronger 
chief executives do not afect term-limited states’ economies in terms of bond debt. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Oklahoma State Bond Advisor, “State of Oklahoma Bonded Indebtedness,” 
htp:/www.ok.gov/bondadvisor/State_Debt/ (accessed February 26, 2013). 
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Unemployment rates wil also serve as an indicator, and stipulate the economic 
conditions and any alteration that these states have experienced since the implementation 
of  
Figure 2 – State Unemployment Rates (%) 
Data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
 
term limits. Of al the economic indicator analysis, this one showed the most uniform 
trend among al fifteen states. Al showed a decline in unemployment rates from 1992-
2001, with eventual steep increases beginning in the 2006-2008 range. Louisiana 
experienced the lone outlier at the end of 2005 as a result of Huricane Katrina. States 
with term limits appear to have been afected by some factor, which has caused their 
unemployment statistics to be affected. However, when states without term limits are 
compared, similar unemployment rate trends are present as wel; indicating that there is 
no distinctive reactionary predisposition in terms of term limits towards state 
unemployment data. If term limits had afected unemployment rates, speculation would 
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be that governors could more easily enact education and training, industry development 
and other job creating measures to decrease the rate through increased spending versus 
their weakened state legislatures. This patern however, is not observed. Rather, there is 
litle diference between term-limited states and their counterparts. Unemployment rates 
across the country as of March 2013 clearly indicate term limits play no role in a 
uniformed tendency (see Figure 2). Economic activity like the Great Recession is the best 
explanation for the increase in unemployment rates around 2006-2008. 
A case study that relates a state with term limits to one without term limits based 
on comparable demographics yields similar results. This paper compares North Dakota, 
which has no term limits, to South Dakota who does (see Table 5).  	  
Table 5 - Demographic Comparison for North Dakota and South Dakota 
Data from U.S. Census Bureau 
	  
When South Dakota, who began to be impacted by term limits in 2000, is compared to 
North Dakota, there are variations at various periods for al of the economic indicators 
mentioned, but none corelating either with their year of impact or the ones immediately 
folowing that would trigger any suspicion relating to term limits or a stronger executive 
branch. Homeownership rates for example, demonstrate no noticeable variation between 
South Dakota and North Dakota that would indicate this corelation (see Figure 3). 
Besides population, state bond debt, unemployment rates and homeownership rates, this 
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research examined high school graduation rates, retail sales and gross domestic product. 
There were no unique trends ilustrating that any abnormal efect strengthened the 
executive’s part in the economic development of these states. Homeownership rates for 
the Dakotas, as seen in Figure 3, show that in the immediate years after South Dakota’s 
year of impact (2000) there was no variation at al from the initial progression that North 
Dakota experienced.  
Figure 3 - Homeownership Rate  
Data from U.S. Census Bureau 
      
Conclusion 
This paper concludes that term limits grant the executive branch increased power 
in the legislative process at the expense of elected legislative representatives. However, 
this seems to have no efect on the economic development of these states, compared to 
economic trends both prior to the implementation of term limits and when compared to 
states without term limits over the same period of time. This disproves the studies 
original hypothesis, concluding that since there were no similarities in economic changes 
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distinct to term-limited states, the strengthened position of governors must not be 
influential on a state’s economy. 
Future research on the subject wil beter observe any changes over longer periods 
of time. This paper is working with data that in some cases was as short as six years since 
the impact of term limits. This creates dificulty in examining the various effects of term 
limits. For example, Nevada did not have their year of impact until 2010 when their 
twelve-year limits, enacted in 1996, began to impact representatives from their state’s 
legislature. This means that there were only two years of available data for with which to 
examine Nevada. This limitation wil mean that analysis for Nevada and other states in 
similar situations wil have to use relatively weaker datasets. Any future studies wil 
reveal any long-term developments in the role that a stronger governor can play in 
afecting these economic indicators and their influence on these states. Future studies 
should also look at additional economic indicators that could create a larger, more 
comprehensive picture of the executive-legislative relationship. An examination of trends 
such as demographic shifts, household income and other datasets could reveal specific 
variations in states with term limits that other economic indicators did not expose.  
Similarly, future studies could examine more deeply into the role that varying 
limits of power and term limits on governors themselves play into the efects of term 
limits on legislators, and how they impact their behavior to increased legislative power. 
Curently thirty-six states in the U.S. have term limits on gubernatorial ofices, including 
al fifteen states that have term limits on their legislatures. The limits vary in term length 
and ability to run for reelection. There could also be an examination into cases of 
executive authority that governors maintain, such as the line-item veto. In this study 
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however, it is safe to assume that term limits do not afect states’ economies in any 
idiosyncratic way. Future studies should also take into consideration how partisan 
politics factors into this analysis. Party control over either branch, whether controled by 
Republican, Democrats or both, could possibly determine how aggressively governors 
use this tilt in power, influence a specific state’s economy diferently.  
It wil be vital for future studies to acknowledge the diferent types of term limits 
in place for both governors and legislatures, and how variations of these limits afect the 
relationship. These disparities in term limit combinations wil require wide-ranging 
examination of the states’ political representation, and how the executive-legislative 
relation changes under various permutations of term limits. This would also help develop 
an appropriate performance benchmark for the analysis of states with term limits. By 
examining legislative productivity, enacted budget proposals, the amount of prior legal or 
expert experience legislators had when assigned to commitees and a variety of other 
standards, it would be possible to see whether states are more or less productive with 
their specific variety of term limits. This would give state oficials a pragmatic analysis 
for how state governments function under term limits, and how they should be adjusted 
accordingly by states to improve the way they conduct their business.  
The results of future studies could also draw paralels for how the executive-
legislative relationship would be afected on the national level if term limits were placed 
on the U.S. Congress. While it would be almost impossible to conduct any case studies or 
examinations of term limits impact federaly since there is no history to examine, the 
information atained through these case studies on states, specificaly larger ones with 
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similar demographic to the nation as a whole, could be seen as comparable to the impact 
term limits would have on the U.S. Legislature. 
It is important to note these factors for future studies to engage further. The ful 
picture on term limits is not yet developed, but combined with the knowledge expanded 
here it wil help direct future exploration on the issue. It wil help further the 
understanding of the skewed executive-legislative relationship, and guide observations in 
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Chapter 2 
Effect of the 17th Amendment on State Legislatures 
 
Introduction 
Since its ratification in 1913, the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has 
mandated that al U.S. senators must be elected by a popular vote. Prior to this 
amendment, senators were elected by state legislatures to six-year terms. Research wil 
explore and examine the question: How do curent state legislators view the 17th 
Amendment and the modern debate over its reform or repeal? This study consists of 
research that examines the history of the 17th amendment and the reasons for its 
implementation. It wil then consider the bil in a modern context, by observing curent 
debates and literature on the subject. This information wil help frame the issue as it is 
understood and debated today, and how individuals with various political ideologies view 
the 17th Amendment. This study wil also engage curent state legislators in order to 
gauge the present-day beliefs of those being limited by the Amendment. This wil alow 
insight into whether curent members of state legislatures feel that the Amendment is stil 
needed or if it is an overextension of federal power and a violation of state representation. 
It is hypothesized that many curent state representatives feel it should be overturned in 
favor of state legislative appointments to the U.S. Senate. This is an important question to 
explore, not only because it wil ilustrate how state legislators view and comprehend the 
evolution of the 17th Amendment, but also because these interviews can help expose any 
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Background and Motivation 
 
 The original intent of having state legislatures appoint U.S. senators was to ensure 
that the federal government consisted of representatives with a vested interest in the 
states, and at the same time vote in a manner that they felt was needed without 
succumbing to unpredictable outcries from the public. Article 1, Section 3, Clauses 1 and 
2 of the Constitution outlines this measure stating: 
Clause 1: The Senate of the United States shal be composed of two senators from 
each state, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years; and each senator shal 
have one vote. 
 
Clause 2: Immediately after they shal be assembled in Consequence of the first 
Election, they shal be divided as equaly as may be into three Classes. The Seats 
of the senators of the first Class shal be vacated at the Expiration of the second 
Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third 
Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every 
second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the 
Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary 
Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shal then fil such 
Vacancies.56 
 
The clauses had overwhelming support at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 
especialy from Anti-Federalists. This measure was seen as a way to ensure states’ power 
and sovereignty within an expanding federal government. Many in the Constitutional 
Convention hoped it would develop the Senate into a body similar to the House of Lords 
in the United Kingdom’s Parliament, consisting of more educated and professional 
statesman rather than the public servants who would serve in the House of 
Representatives.57 It would also alow state legislatures the ability to direct their senators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Cornel University Law School, “U.S. Constitution – Article I,” htp:/www.law.cornel.edu/constitution/articlei 
(accessed June 15, 2013). 
57 Jay Bybee, “Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment,” 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas – Wiliam S. Boyd School of Law, 1997, Pg. 509.	  
	   	   	  
	   40	  
on maters coming before Congress. Senators would be the direct representatives of state 
assemblies while the House would serve the people. 
 Motions for a constitutional amendment reforming the way U.S. senators were 
elected was introduced as early as 1826.58 At the time, one of the main reasons was 
charges of coruption. There was a wide-ranging consensus that many seats in the U.S. 
Senate were being filed by legislators and businessmen who were paying of state 
representatives for votes. The most notable case was Montana oficial Wiliam A. Clark. 
A prominent newspaper and mine owner throughout Montana, Clark was found to have 
bribed several members of the Montana State Legislature for votes in an 1899 election, 
and was refused his seat in the Senate at that time.59 
 There was also the noticeable number of unfiled seats in the U.S. Senate left by 
inconclusive legislative elections. Between the years of 1891 and 1905, eight state 
legislatures were unable to elect a senator, and were without representation for periods of 
ten months up to four years.60 Delaware provided the most critical example, being unable 
to elect a U.S. Senator in 1895, 1899, 1901 and 1905 and leaving seats unfiled from 
March 1899 to March 1903.61 
 As more states and political parties across the United States began caling for 
constitutional conventions on the mater, reform seemed inevitable. The vote came before 
the U.S. Senate and passed 64-24 with 4 abstentions, passed the House of Representatives 
238 to 39 with 110 abstentions and by the time Secretary of State Wiliam Jennings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Bybee, “Ulysses at the Mast…”Pg. 536. 
59 Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, “CLARK, Wiliam Andrews, (1839-1925),” 
htp:/bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000454 (accessed 22, 2013). 
60 Bybee, “Ulysses at the Mast…”Pg. 542. 
61 Ibid., Pg. 542.	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Bryan announced its adoption on May 31, 1913, it had been ratified by three-quarters of 
the states (see Figure 3), and read: 
-The Senate of the United States shal be composed of two senators from each 
state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shal have one 
vote. The electors in each state shal have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures. 
-When vacancies happen in the representation of any state in the Senate, the 
executive authority of such state shal issue writs of election to fil such 
vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any state may empower the executive 
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fil the vacancies by 
election as the legislature may direct. 
-This amendment shal not be so construed as to afect the election or term of any 
Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.62 
 
 Extensive research has been done by political scientists concerning the role of the 
17th Amendment and its efects on the political composition of the U.S. Senate and state 
legislatures. Research tends to focus on a shift away from the copy, as Alexander 
Hamilton refered to it, which occured between state legislatures and their dominant 
political party electing delegates who were of similar political ideology as their state’s 
majority. These scholarly works examine how this has changed the way majority control 
of the U.S. Senate has shifted from what it would have been without the implementation 
of the amendment.63 Studies emphasize the rise of special interest groups as a result of 
the 17th Amendment, and how it has alowed for the impact of advocacy groups and 
lobbyists from outside the elected oficial’s state to impact their views. Judge Jay Bybee 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provides some of the most 
extensive examination of the 17th Amendment and its ramifications in his work Ulysses at 
the Mast: Democracy, Federalism and the Sirens’ Song of the Seventeenth Amendment. 
In it, Bybee uses historical analysis of party makeup in both state legislatures and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Cornel University Law School, “U.S. Constitution –17th Amendment,” 
htp:/www.law.cornel.edu/constitution/amendmentxvi (accessed June 15, 2013). 
63 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, “The Federalist Papers,” Penguin Books, 1961, Pg. 367.	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U.S. Senate from the late 19th century to the late 20th century to ilustrate shifts in control 
Figure 4- Ratification of the 17th Amendment by States 
 
of the Senate over more than a hundred year period in the United States.64 
 Bybee briefly touches on the issue of how the 17th Amendment could have played 
a role in disengagement between the citizenry and the state legislatures. He makes the 
point that state oficials today are “elected by a relatively smal proportion of the 
electorate.” Bybee expands on this point by arguing that these oficials have experienced 
a shift where before state legislative issues and elections were endowed by the influential 
fact that the legislators elected by the citizenry held control of their representation in the 
U.S. Senate to one today in which state legislatures have litle to no federal oversight.65 
This insight raises the question of how the 17th Amendment changes the intent of Article 
One of the Constitution, a change which John Jay described as “…the activity of party 
zeal taking advantage of their supineness, the ignorance and the hope and fears of the 
unwary and interested, often places men in the ofice by the votes of a smal proportion 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Bybee, “Ulysses at the Mast…”Pg. 552. 
65 Bybee, “Ulysses at the Mast…”Pg. 556. 
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Previous Research on the 17th Amendment 
 
17th Amendment research and literature tend to focus on arguments for state 
representation in the federal government versus arguments for alowing the responsibility 
of representation in the U.S. Senate to fal with the people. Within this existing literature, 
there come two distinct lines of argument, one that supports the 17th and another that cals 
for clear reform, and in some cases its complete repeal. Charles C. W. Cooke, in his 
National Review article “Repeal the 17th Amendment,” takes the later approach, arguing 
that the 17th Amendment has dismantled the Constitution as a democratic instrument into 
one that involves what he describes as where “America’s democracy fetishists go 
wrong.”67 His argument includes the stance that the Senate simply was not designed to 
include popular sovereignty, and to make an argument for it is similar to alowing the 
public to vote for Supreme Court Justices.68 This separation is argued to have done 
nothing more than establish another branch of the U.S. Congress that is identical to the 
House of Representatives, and efectively eliminated the states’ oversight capacity of the 
federal government. 
Cooke explains this dismissal of what he labels as a clear management capacity 
held by the states on the federal government by saying: 
The Senate was not intended to be the people’s representative body, but that of 
the states. Lest the federal government “swalow up the state legislatures,” George 
Mason insisted to his felow convention delegates in Philadelphia, “let the state 
legislatures appoint the Senate.” The delegates backed him unanimously.69 
 
Looking at the environment within which the 17th Amendment arose, Cooke also 
concludes that the Wilson-Era Progressives of the time did not have a strong enough 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Charles C.W. Cooke, National Review, “Repeal the 17th Amendment,” 
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justification to separate the two levels of government, and ultimately alow the federal 
government to grow and function with litle oversight from those of the states. The main 
argument for the 17th Amendment, as previously mentioned, dealt with concerns of 
coruption and bribery that were extensive at the time in Senatorial elections. Cooke 
points out that since the Amendment was implemented, there is now more money in 
politics, and no bufer between outside interests and U.S. senators.70 
Parts of the previously mentioned work by Judge Bybee echo these sentiments, 
and discuss how it has led to situations in which senators have become more legislatively 
isolated since 1913. Whereas, state legislatures had, and some continue to, issued 
requests of their Senate representatives, few adhered or listened to those reports 
folowing implementation of the amendment. In fact they became less inclined to vote 
together with their state’s other representatives than any prior time in U.S. history. Bybee 
cites this lack of legislative direction by state houses as the reason for the rise of public 
opinion pols in the U.S.71 These pols continue to give senators direction on issues that 
are before them, but they are coming from a source that is largely unfamiliar with specific 
issues, limiting their quality. Bybee argues that this is a far cry from legislative directives 
and instructions that were issued by state legislatures, and individuals with expertise and 
an understanding of the initiatives they were pushing. 
Bybee also atributes the significant number of terms that senators hold their 
ofices today to the 17th Amendment. Prior to its implementation, senators were elected 
by individuals in state legislatures who had their own lofty ambitions of public ofice.72 
They were much more inclined to watch senators and pay atention to their endeavors 
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more closely, resulting in a beter environment of legislative accountability. Senators had 
to respond to what their elective body deemed significant. Opening elections up to the 
public also made the U.S. Senate much more vulnerable to the powerful influence of 
political machines and party bosses.73 
Another significant assessment of the 17th amendment includes its efects on the 
relationship between state legislatures and the federal courts. Donald Kochan ilustrates 
this in his study State Laws and the Independent Judiciary: An analysis of the Efects of 
the Seventeenth Amendment on the Number of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws 
Unconstitutional. In it he concludes that when senators broke free of their bond to state 
legislatures, their political careers were no longer intertwined with those of state 
legislative sovereignty, and in fact became competitive with it as true members of the 
federal government.74 With this, Kochan argues that state legislatures lost their ability to 
use senators as a congressional control mechanism to incite the federal judiciary to 
uphold any state laws that may become chalenged. His study shows that courts had 
operated under an atitude of “institutional stability” with the Senate prior to the 
implementation of the 17th Amendment.75 During this period, the court’s inclinations 
were more alied and corelated with the preferences of state legislatures. What Kochan 
refers to as an “avoidance of reprisal” created scenarios in which it was much simpler for 
courts to preserve state legislative preferences, and maintain an order that was in their 
best interest.76 However, with the separation created by the 17th Amendment between 
state lawmakers interests and that of the federal government, courts were free to begin 
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pursuing their own policy preferences without running the risk of retribution from the 
Senate.  
Many scholarly works have used the 17th Amendment as the basis to study unique 
tradeofs in representations between various institutional entities, exploring how the 
amendment’s transfer of indirect and direct accountability have afected the government 
in even greater capacities. Political Scientists Sean Gailmard and Jefry A. Jenkins test 
this measure and any adverse efects it may have had on the House of Representatives in 
their work Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment and Representation in the Senate. By 
examining units of observation, including state ideology, vote records and other methods 
of calculating dynamic measurement comparisons, they were able to determine that the 
17th Amendment is not associated with any changes in responsiveness or discretion of 
House members.77 This conclusion alows a basis for their argument that, changes in the 
Senate as a result of the 17th Amendment, are solely the result of shifts within indirect 
and direct accountability pertaining to the U.S. Senate, not the result of broader political 
forces.78 They resolve that a tradeof does exist as a result of the 17th Amendment. 
Senators have, as a result of its passage, become receptive to the direct power of their 
state’s citizenry, expanding what they label as a “democraticaly stronger standard” and 
not afecting any other fraction of government.79 However, the citizenry would be 
noticeably more inexperienced than their previous electorate, eliminating some of the 
legislative professionalism that the standard once had. They summarize their empirical 
data on this trade-of by saying it is “analogous to comparing two estimators, one having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Sean Gailmard, Jeffery A. Jenkins, “Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate,” 
Midwest Political Science Association, 2009, Pg. 338. 
78 Gailmard, “Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment…”, Pg. 339. 
79 Ibid.	  
	   	   	  
	   47	  
lower bias but greater variance than the other,” and while it is an important factor to 
recognize in any design of electoral institution, it does mater more for representation of 
the people and their interests to be reflected in public policy via the Senate.80 
Evidence and Methods of Analysis 
This research provides an analysis of information and interviews, acquired from 
existing data and firsthand interviews with state legislators and scholars of the 17th 
Amendment. This alows for any impacts on the function of state legislators caused by 
the 17th Amendment to be explored through personal accounts, and provide an insight 
into the perception state legislators have of the Amendment’s efect on a wide-range of 
issues. This includes voter participation in state legislative elections and the relationship 
these legislators have with their constituents. By combining information from these 
interviews with historical perspectives and additional research, this study wil broaden the 
existing knowledge on impacts of the 17th Amendment on state legislatures, including 
how this afects their task of efectively conducting their business.  
The method of analysis for this report wil be based on statements and interviews 
of both the Republican and Democratic state representatives. This analysis wil reveal an 
understanding of how ideological perceptions play into the modern debate over the 17th 
Amendment, and how this develops claims regarding the impact of the Amendment on 
state legislatures. Interviews and evaluation of existing data wil then be able to 
determine if limitations placed on state legislatures by the 17th Amendment do create 
unintended outcomes that might hurt or assist state legislatures in performing their roles, 
and the extent to which politics plays into that outcome.  
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The generic term for al state-level legislative bodies wil be “state legislature.” 
Curently, a slight majority of states refer to their legislative bodies as “state 
legislatures,” while the remaining states refer to theirs as various types of general 
assemblies or courts. For the purpose of continuity, this research wil be examined with 
an understanding that this term is refering to the legislative institutions within each of 
the states. 
Results 
 The intent of the 17th Amendment was to reduce the role of power and money in 
choosing who represented states in the U.S. Senate, and to incentivize incumbent senators 
to conduct their business with the best interest of the people in mind, or risk punishment 
at the pols. The Founders thought that their intricate framework of power distribution 
would ensure a competition of natural self-interests. The Campaign to Restore Federalism 
refers to this as a measure of interest to “preserve the integrity of the states, these 
independent but united “laboratories of democracy”, and it is this federal system that the 
17th Amendment (which provides for the direct, popular election of U.S. senators) 
destroyed.”81 Those who are in alignment with this measure believe that the sentiments 
alude to the Senate becoming an unchecked political machine, with no incentive towards 
alegiance with the people versus that of special interest.  
 The progressive movement to ratify the 17th Amendment was supported by 
national figures such as Wiliam Jennings Bryan, fervently arguing for its support. The 
previously mentioned cases of coruption within State Legislatures had reached a point in 
the late 19th Century at which the Senate investigated ten cases for aleged bribery and 
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coruption.82 Conservatives opposing the amendment argued that ten cases over roughly a 
fifty-year period did not warant a complete change to the mode of election, but rather a 
structural change. Senator Elihu Root of New York, an opponent of the amendment, 
asked “[why] abandon…rather than reform the system…”83 The evidence of coruption 
that had been brought to light by Senate investigations failed to make any connection to a 
flaw within a system of indirect elections. Bybee raises the question about completely 
changing the system by saying, “If the people had proven so notoriously inept in electing 
state legislators, what made us think they would prove more capable of electing U.S. 
senators? What populism was there to the cynicism with which popularly elected state 
legislatures were viewed?”84  
Interviews and discussions with curent members of state legislatures yield 
interesting results. There does not appear to be a large disparity between Republicans and 
Democrats concerning the efects of the 17th Amendment, but rather a concern for the 
way it functions than in its overal existence. This is surprising because it would certainly 
be expected that more Republicans would support overturning the 17thAmendment, given 
the consistent conservative argument for state’s rights. From speaking with Republicans 
and Democrats in the North Carolina General Assembly and other states it has became 
evident that a more common view is that the 17th Amendment creates a sort of protective 
barier between state legislatures and many issues that plagues the U.S. Congress. 
An issue that came up regularly in interviews was the impact of campaign 
financing and special interests groups. With the exception of congressional redistricting, 
since the 17th Amendment was enacted there has been litle need to influence the votes or 
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campaigns of state representatives on a level with national implications. This means that 
state representatives tend to be elected much more often on their political stances and 
values rather than on capital. This research’s original hypothesis was that there would be 
stronger cals towards granting this power back to state representatives so as to give them 
more atention and a stronger association with their constituents. It appears, however, that 
both Republicans and Democrats in North Carolina have learned lessons by watching 
their federal counterparts deal with gridlock rather than results. State Representative 
Nathan Ramsey, a Republican serving a district in western North Carolina, felt that the 
ability to appoint U.S. senators would certainly create more atention for their legislative 
body, but with a great cost. He summed up his feelings by saying, “The stakes of electing 
state representatives would be higher, cost of elections would be great, and there would 
be more [outside] influence because of the national scope.”85 
Representative Ramsey also discussed how he felt the 17th Amendment was 
efective at preventing coruption in state legislatures. While he did say, “there wil 
always be coruption as long as people serve in public ofice,” he made the clear assertion 
that, because of the 17th Amendment, “there is less today than there has been historicaly, 
despite public opinion to the contrary.” Representative Ramsey did not make any claims 
that he felt constituent involvement with their legislature would be greater were the 17th 
Amendment removed, and the power of state legislatures increased. He did say that he 
felt repeal “would probably increase the prominence of state legislatures,” but only in 
regards to the role they play on the federal level.86 A Democratic Representative of the 
North Carolina General Assembly, who asked to remain unanimous, echoed these 
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sentiments saying, “I don’t believe that citizen involvement via voter turnout or atention 
to legislative mater would increase anymore than it curently is. If you look at the Moral 
Monday Protests that have been happening here in North Carolina since 2013 it seems 
that the people are already aware and cognizant of what’s happening in Raleigh.” When 
asked what efect, if any, the 17th Amendment has on state legislatures he responded, “I 
do feel that it keeps considerable amounts of coruption and special interest out of the 
Assembly, and alows us to do our jobs without having to listen to the needs of those 
handing out big checks like the U.S. Congress.” 87 
The only groups and representatives extremely adamant about overturning the 
17th Amendment were ones who were on the far right side of the political spectrum. They 
argue that the 17th Amendment takes away from a system of vertical checks and balances 
that the Framers intended in order to guarantee that state sovereignty and influence could 
be felt throughout the national government. Former New Jersey Superior Court Judge 
Andrew P. Napolitano is one of these voices and a strong advocate for limited 
constitutional government. When asked in an interview in 2010 what he thought was the 
single most needed political reform was, he responded: 
I would repeal the 17th Amendment. Can an amendment to the Constitution itself 
be unconstitutional? Yes, that one. If you read Madison’s notes from the 
constitutional convention, they spent more time arguing over the make-up of the 
federal government and they came up with the federal table. There would be three 
entities at the federal table. There would be the nation as a nation, there would be 
the people, and there would be the states. The nation as a nation is the president, 
the people is the House of Representatives, and the states is the Senate, because 
states sent senators. Not the people in the states, but the state government. When 
the progressives, in the Theodore Roosevelt/Woodrow Wilson era, abolished this 
it abolished bicameralism, the notion of two houses. It efectively just gave us 
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another house like the House of Representatives where they didn’t have to run as 
frequently, and the states lost their place at the federal table.88 
 
Critics such as this argue repeatedly that states have lost their representation and 
influence on the national level, yet the Senate partakes in many issues that have no direct 
impact or bearing on states independently. The Senate has the sole responsibility of 
appointing federal judges, authorizing cabinet positions and ratifying treaties. This alows 
for federalism and a beter system of national representation to occur.  
 The rise of the Tea Party in 2010 increased cals for repeal of the 17th 
Amendment. National organizations, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council 
joined the movement as wel, supporting draft legislation like the Equal State’s 
Enfranchisement Act, which would amend state constitutions to alow state legislatures to 
nominate individuals for placement on general election balots. U.S. Senator Mike Lee of 
Utah, who delivered the 2014 Tea Party State of the Union response, has said in the past 
that he feels the 17th Amendment was a complete mistake, saying he does “think that we 
lost something when we adopted it.”89 Former Congressman Pete Hoekstra of Michigan, 
and felow Tea Party Caucus member, shares Senator Lee’s perspective. During his 2012 
race for the U.S. Senate against incumbent Senator Debbie Stabenow, Rep. Hoekstra 
expressed his support for repealing the 17th Amendment, by saying, “I think that would 
be a positive thing..the direct election of U.S. senators made the U.S. Senate act and 
behave like the House of Representatives. The end result has led to an erosion of states’ 
rights.”90 
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Missouri State Representative Stephen Webber, a Democrat, explained in an 
interview how he felt the 17th Amendment alowed the U.S. Senate to be a beter 
ideologicaly representation of his state, rather than simply be a mundane miror of the 
state legislature. He explained this by saying, “in recent Missouri political history, we’ve 
had a U.S. Senator from a diferent party than what our state legislature was controled 
by. In the late 90s we had a Republican Senator in John Ashcroft, while Democrats 
controled the legislature. Today, we have Claire McCaskil in the Senate while 
Republicans control the state legislature. We definitely have individuals chosen by the 
citizens of Missouri that would be diferent were the 17th Amendment not in place.” He 
also argues that without the amendment, an increase in special interest money and bribery 
would not only be bad for the integrity of the body, but also for party strength as wel. 
Various factions within both the Democrat and Republican Party would become, in his 
view, “even more isolated and hostile. Deals would be cut left and right creating partisan 
bickering that would be on a much greater level than even exists today. Imagine what 
would happen with a Republican legislature divided with Tea Party Republicans on one 
side and Traditional Republicans on another. The 17th Amendment prevents us from 
having to see that scenario play out.”91 
Over the past one hundred years since the amendment went into efect state 
legislatures have tended to be more conservatively controled. The research conducted by 
Bybee ilustrates that this has made the legislative history of the United States look much 
diferent from what it otherwise would have. Republicans would have controlled the U.S. 
Senate much more regularly than Democrats.92 In their work The Efect of the 17th 
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Amendment on the Party Composition of the Senate: A Counterfactual Analysis, authors 
Wendy Schiler and Charles Stewart downplay this argument to an extent, saying that the 
17th Amendment did not afect which party controled the Senate for long periods, but 
instead it did afect the size of the majorities Republicans and Democrats have had since 
1913.93 At the time of this research there are twenty-seven Republican-controled 
Legislatures, eighteen-Democratic-controled Legislatures and five equaly divided. This 
means that had the 17th Amendment never been implemented, the Republicans would 
curently have at least fifty-four seats and control of the Senate, giving their party the 
ability to defeat and defund legislation like the Afordable Care Act, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and other legislation they viewed unfavorably. 
Similarly, it would change the dynamic of the curent filibuster debate in the United 
States, shifting which party would be most likely to use it and potentialy changing the 
volume of cloture cals being invoked. This is an important notion to keep in mind as to 
why those on the far right of the political spectrum and like-minded pundits argue for the 
repeal of the 17th Amendment. The argument that Judge Andrew Napolitano and others 
make for this being an assault on the infrastructure of constitutional government is that 
the end result is not a true national reflection given the political makeup of the Senate.94 
Changes in the growth of the federal government have much less to do with the 17th 
Amendment and the vanishing of state’s rights and more to do with how the United 
States has changed since 1913. Population growth, technological advancements, and 
America’s leadership role explains infrastructural changes in the Constitutional 
Government, not changes brought on by the 17th Amendment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Charles Stewart, Wendy Schiler, MIT Political Science, “The effects of the 17th Amendment on the Party 
Composition of the Senate:” A Counterfactual Analysis,” MIT, 2011, Pg. 37. 
94 Root, “Injustice System.”	  
	   	   	  
	   55	  
The views of representatives interviewed here indicate that most state legislatures, 
regardless of party, are content with less national atention and potentialy a more 
engaged citizenry. The 17th Amendment creates a political shield between them and the 
negative qualities of politics in an increasingly divided nation. A North Carolina 
Democratic Representative in the General Assembly summed up his feelings on the 
mater by saying, “the amendment alows things to actualy get brought forward and 
voted on in the states. More often than not bils are passed on importance and 
accomplishment, rather than by who has the deepest pockets.”95 This also alows for 
states to generaly have state legislatures more easily controled by one party at a time, 
and for legislation and initiatives to actualy be enacted. It is clear that state legislation 
actualy does get passed compared to the stalemates and partisan bickering that occurs in 
Congress. For example, the 112th Congress of the United States passed only 561 bils 
from 2011 to 2012.96 When compared to the New York State Legislature, a professional, 
ful-time legislature, that passed 679 bils in the 2011 legislative session alone, one can 
see the increased issue of partisanship that exists on the federal level.97 While those on 
the far right may cal for repeal of the Amendment, it appears that the bulk of 
Republicans and Democrats recognize that it alows them to conduct their business within 
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Conclusion 
The information presented from curent state legislators concludes that the 17th 
Amendment alows representatives on the state level to efectively cary out their duties 
as lawmakers without increased distractions that come from campaign finance and 
special interest money, which would be likely were they stil tasked with the 
responsibility of appointing United State senators. Furthermore, their sentiment seems to 
be that the 17th Amendment had litle to no efect on the relationship between their 
legislative bodies and the constituents they represent. This is diferent from the original 
hypothesis, which predicted that the 17th Amendment and the removal of senatorial 
appointment would have decreased constituent interest in their state representatives. 
While it was anticipated that members of state legislatures would be much more inclined 
to support overturning or reforming the 17th Amendment in order to increase their role in 
the federal government and increase constituent atention in their maters, this study 
reveals that state legislators seem much more concerned with being productive within 
their respective bodies than dealing with increased volumes of national atention and 
scrutiny, which plagues their federal counterparts. This research also concluded that 
arguments in favor of overturning the 17th Amendment are more for political, ideological 
reasons, rather than concerns over the functionality and influence of state legislatures. 
This study relied heavily on prior, scholarly works on the 17th Amendment and 
this research’s analysis of the views of political figures on the state and federal level. This 
data was used to develop an understanding of the diferent views and opinions of elected 
oficials concerning the 17th Amendment’s impact on citizen involvement with their state 
legislatures. Future research could magnify this examination, by looking at voter turnout 
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rates in state legislative elections in the years prior to and after the enactment of the 17th 
Amendment in 1913, to reveal any decrease in the number of voters. Since balots that 
include state legislatures would most likely include national races, it would be important 
to examine voting results in specific state races, and how those vote totals for the same 
seat vary over time. A good recommendation for examining such figures would be to do 
so over a period of time that includes several balots from presidential and midterm 
elections around 1913; for example examining 1904-1922 would alow any impact from 
the 17th Amendment in voter participation in specific state election to be seen in 
presidential and midterm elections before and after the amendments enactment. Limited 
election results made available by state governments had proved dificult to gather, which 
is why it is not included in this study.   
 Future studies could include more extensive interviews with additional legislators. 
This could be done in the form of a pol asking legislators to express their views on the 
original intent of the Senate as the representative body of the States, compared to direct 
election by the people. Their views on the potential dismantlement of the 17th 
Amendment and the resulting impact, would alow for an expansion into this study’s 
findings regarding support for the “repeal the 17th Amendment” movement. Ideological 
or economic trends among legislators would reveal why some conservatives support 
repeal while others do not. 
 Ultimately, this study concludes that the 17th Amendment does create inadvertent 
efects on the role of state legislators. However, those efects alow legislatures to 
conduct their business in an environment that minimizes outside influences and alows 
them to vote on legislation with the best interest of their constituents in mind. It also 
	   	   	  
	   58	  
alows for a U.S. Senate that is a beter representation of the political makeup of the 
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Chapter 3 
The Impact of Initiatives and Referendums on State Legislatures 
 
Introduction 
 In a 1920 speech, Wiliam Jennings Bryan stated, “We have the initiative and 
referendum in Nebraska; do not disturb them. If defects are discovered, corect them and 
perfect the machinery. Make it possible for the people to have what they want. We are the 
world’s teacher in democracy, the world looks to us for an example. We cannot ask 
others to trust the people unless we are ourselves wiling to trust them.”98 A strong 
supporter of popular democracy and the Progressive Movement, Bryan saw balot 
measures as a way to circumvent the coruption found in state legislatures in the early 
20th Century and give the people direct control over laws and changes they deemed 
necessary. In the early 1900s, balot measures were used in states across the United States 
to pass laws for woman’s sufrage, presidential primaries, wage and hour laws, child 
labor act, and to regulate banks, railroads and utilities among others.99 It is unlikely 
however, that Bryan could have foreseen the evolution of balot measures into what today 
is often refered to as the initiative industry. 
 This research wil explore and examine the question: Do balot initiatives and 
referendums hurt or inhibit the role of state legislatures? This examination wil explore 
the historical context and various functions of initiatives and referendums in the United 
States. It wil also identify distinct periods of functionality of balot measures, and when 
the initiative industry realy started in the United States. Building upon previous research, 
this study wil be able to identify what afects if any, the initiative industry and direct 
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democracy itself has had on state legislatures in the modern era of balot measures. This 
important question wil help to expand our understanding of balot measures and if they 
are useful or harmful in this modern era. It is anticipated that this research wil reveal that 
both the initiative industry and uninformed citizen involvement in balot measures 
negatively afects state legislatures.  
Types of Balot Measures 
 Initiatives and referendums are actions in which measures can be placed on 
balots so that public citizens can vote directly on an issue. While the two processes do 
vary, they both are examples of direct democracy where the people decide on the 
outcomes of policies. 
 The initiative process, also known as balot initiatives, gives voters the ability to 
propose a legislative measure, with a statutory initiative, or a constitutional amendment, 
with a constitutional initiative, by filing a petition that requires a specific amount of valid 
citizen signatures. There are two types of initiatives that states can adopt, with the first 
being direct initiatives. These are proposals where once the minimum amount of 
signatures has been gathered it is placed directly onto the next balot for a statewide vote. 
The second is indirect initiatives, in which proposals, once the required number of 
signatures is gathered, are sent to the legislature. From there, the state legislature has the 
opportunity to act on the initiative. They can choose to reject it, vote on a diferent 
proposal, or take no action at al and place the initiative on the balot for the public to 
vote on.100 
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 Initiative processes have been included in the constitutions of twenty-four states, 
alowing for some type of statutory or constitutional initiative. Al of these states have 
their own variation of the initiative process, but revolve around the same general actions. 
The first step is having a petition filed with the designated state oficial. The oficial 
varies from the Secretary of State in some situations to Atorney Generals and even the 
Lieutenant Governor in Utah.101 The petition is then reviewed for compliance with either 
the statutory or constitutional initiative requirements. The language of the proposal is also 
checked, to ensure that intent and purpose of the proposal is accurate. The next step 
involves the preparation of a balot title and initiative summary.102 Many see this as one 
of the most important steps in the initiative process, since it decides the name and 
summary of the proposal that wil appear before the voters. Once again, while there is a 
wide variation among the states on procedures, the majority involves review and approval 
by an elected official (most often the Atorney General) or some type of Balot Title 
Board.103 After approval, the petition can be circulated to gather the required number of 
voter signatures designated by each state. Then the petition is sent to the state election 
oficial who wil verify the signatures and, depending on that state’s process, determine if 
the initiative is valid to be placed on the balot or sent to the state legislature, depending 
on that state’s process.104 
 The referendum process also has several diferent forms. Just like initiatives, they 
are used to foster measures towards appearing on balots. Popular referendums are very 
similar to initiatives, requiring a specific amount of signatures to be gathered in order for 
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a popular vote to take place. One important diference however, is that popular 
referendums are used to approve or deny an act that the legislature has already approved. 
In most states where this is alowed, citizens usualy have around a 90-day comment 
period after the law has been passed to petition and gather signatures.105 Similarly to 
initiatives, once the minimum for signatures has been reached and verified, the new law 
wil not take efect as scheduled, but rather wil appear on the balot for a popular vote. If 
accepted the law can take efect as scheduled, but if rejected it is deemed void. The law 
would also not take efect in the time between passage and the popular vote if the petition 
has been verified. Twenty-three states and the U.S. Virgin Islands alow for popular 
referendums, with Maryland and New Mexico being the only ones that do not also alow 
some type of initiative.106 
Legislative referendums alow state governments to refer measures on their own 
accord to balots for a popular vote. Many states require this to be done for changes to 
state constitutions, tax code changes, and other measures. These are usualy seen as much 
less controversial than popular referendums, which are more likely to involve citizen 
proposals on a controversial mater. Every state legislature can use a legislative 
referendum to have a measure appear on a balot.107 
The final type of referendum is the advisory referendum. In alows legislatures 
and governors to place questions on balots in order to get voter opinions on proposed 
laws or measures that might be taken up or considered by the state government. It is 
important to note that there is no binding efect from an advisory referendum; rather they 
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are used solely as a tool to counsel or make recommendations to state oficials as to the 
disposition of the people on a mater.108 
Federalists v Anti-Federalists 
The debate over initiatives is one that has been happening in the United States 
since it’s founding. Arguments regarding direct and representative democracy, and the 
extent to which they should be alowed were widespread in the new nation from 1787 to 
1788 as ratification of the Constitution was being debated.109 Anti-Federalists opposed 
the Constitution, believing rather that direct democracy should be the prevalent form. 
They sought to give more power to a populous that had just thrown of the chains of 
monarchy and supported the Articles of Confederation. Federalists supported the 
proposed republican structure of the Constitution, and the representation that it provided 
for citizens. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and other Federalists 
envisioned America developing beyond an agrarian society into a large, diverse 
commercialized nation in what would become a globalized world.110 
Federalists wanted to protect minority factions, which would be created in such a 
large society, from being oppressed in a direct democracy where the majority could rule 
legislatively. Madison recognized many of the Anti-Federalists fears with representative 
democracy, and the possibility that “sinister” men could take power.111 He addressed this 
fear and how to prevent it in Federalist 10 saying: 
The question resulting is, whether smal or extensive republics are more favorable 
to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in 
favor of the later by two obvious considerations: In the first place, it is to be 
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remarked that, however smal the republic may be, the representatives must be 
raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, 
however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to 
guard against the confusion of a multitude… In the next place, as each 
representative wil be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in 
the smal republic, it wil be more dificult for unworthy candidates to practice 
with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often caried…112 
 
Anti-Federalists viewed this expansion as a violation to the people and state’s 
rights. They saw the consolidation of power in the national government as an 
infringement of individual liberties, with the possibility that a strong centralized 
government reflected monarchic power. Individuals labeled as Anti-Federalists 
considered themselves the true Federalists, and began writing essays and leters to 
counter the Federalist Papers.113 This uncoordinated efort became known as the Anti-
Federalist Papers, and included such prominent citizens as George Clinton, Robert Yates 
and Richard Henry Lee.114 Patrick Henry was another prominent opponent of the 
Constitution, giving fiery speeches in which he caled for direct representation. In a 1788 
speech entitled Shal Liberty or Empire Be Sought? Henry declared, “This, sir, is the 
language of democracy – that a majority of the community have a right to alter 
government when found to be oppressive. But how diferent is the genius of your new 
Constitution from this! How diferent from the sentiments of freemen that a contemptible 
minority can prevent the good of the majority!”115 
It is interesting then, since it is universaly considered that Federalist and 
representative democracy won this debate with the ratification of the Constitution, that 
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more than two centuries later balot measures would be so popular. It should be noted that 
while Federalists supported representative democracy, there are references in the 
Federalist Papers to the role of the people as an enhancement to checks and balances, 
taking advantage of the true power in a republic, the people. James Madison expressed 
this sentiment in Federalist 49, stating: “As the people are the only legitimate fountain of 
power, and it is from them the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of 
government hold their power is derived, it seems strictly consonant to the republican 
theory to recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to 
enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of government, but also whenever any one of 
the departments may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others.”116 
In this essay, Madison is arguing that the people should be treated as a safeguard against 
the encroachment of government branches, ensuring that they obey their designated 
function. This hints to a commonality between Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the 
function of representation, and helps explain the progression of balot measures and 
direct democracy in the U.S.  
History of Balot Measures 
Even before the United States existed, citizens in towns across New England 
colonies would have town hal meetings in a referendum-style process to decide on laws 
and ordinances. Thomas Jeferson was an early advocate of the process in his home state 
of Virginia, recommending referendums to be included in the 1775 Virginia state 
constitution.117 While that recommendation fel short, states like Georgia (1776), 
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Massachusets (1778), New Hampshire (1792), Connecticut (1818), Maine (1819), New 
York (1820) and Rhode Island (1824) all mandated referendums for constitutional 
approvals of changes.118 This in turn, led to the U.S. Congress making legislative 
referendums for constitutional changes mandatory in 1857 for al new states joining the 
United States. Today, every state’s constitution with the exception of Delaware requires 
voter approval for constitutional amendments.119 
The Progressive movement of the late 19th and early 20th century served as a 
catalyst for balot initiatives and popular referendums. It was during this time that citizens 
across the nation were becoming deeply dissatisfied with government coruption and an 
inherent failure to address the concerns and wishes of the people. While their platforms 
focused on a variety of topics, a primary one was the establishment of these balot 	  
measures as a way for citizens to push for needed reforms that were being blocked by 
state legislatures. Nebraska, in 1987, was the first state to alow cities to have initiatives 
and referendums in their charters.120 They were folowed a year later by South Dakota, 
who was the first state to adopt a statewide process for initiatives and referendums on 
November 5, 1898. They were soon folowed by Utah (1900), Oregon (1902), Montana 
(1904), Oklahoma (1907), Maine (1908) and Michigan (1908).121 
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Table 6 - State Initiative and Referendum Provisions122 
 
The populist movement and the notion of reform had especialy taken hold in 
western states. 123 The elected class and elites in Southern and Eastern states were much 
more hesitant to enact amendments, out of fear that African-Americans or immigrants 
would use the new political power to enact reforms not consistent with their beliefs.124 
Similarly, growing concerns regarding German sympathizers and immigrants in the 
United State prior to World Wars I and I, led to a decline in support for initiative and 
popular referendums in this time.125 It would not be until Alaska was admited to the 
Union in 1959 that another state adopted the policy as part of their Constitution. The 
initiative process as a whole, declined from 293 proposals from 1911-1920 to only 87 
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proposals from 1961-1970.126 This trend was certainly impacted by factors such as major 
wars and the Great Depression, but was quickly reversed in 1978 with California’s 
Proposition 13. This initiative was used to cut property taxes from 2.5% of market value 
to just 1%, receiving close to a 65% favorable vote with 70% of California’s electorate 
participating.127 Since then there has been a noticeable uptick in proposals, with 271 from 
1981-1990, and 389 from 1991-2000.128 
Previous Research on Initiatives and Referendums  
The history of balot measures is generaly divided into three distinct periods. The 
first is the “Progressive movement era,” when states began alowing citizen-led proposals 
to be placed on balots, and referendums increased in popularity as a tool to enact reform. 
Scholars generaly think of this period stretching from 1898-1940.129 The second is 
refered to as the “middle era” of balot measures. This represents the period between the 
U.S. entering World War I in 1941 up until the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. It was 
during this time that the use and popularity of balot measures as a political tool 
declined.130 The final stage, and the one this paper wil examine, is the “modern age” of 
balot measures. This is the period from 1978 to today, and includes the resurgence of 
balot initiatives and referendums as a tool to influence states more directly in terms of 
fiscal and social changes.131 
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There are two distinct views towards existing research and scholarly works 
concerning this modern age of balot measures. The first considers balot initiatives and 
referendums as a detriment to state governments in the United States. This group argues 
that the “corporatization” of balot measures turns them into yet another weapon for 
organizations with deep pockets to control public sentiment and implement policies, 
without the greater review and possibly rejection in state legislatures. Washington Post 
columnist and author of Democracy Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of 
Money, David Broder, adheres to this view, and considers this modern age of balot 
initiatives to be a danger to America’s system of government. He and other researchers 
argue that since 1978, the use of balot measures have been taken over by special and 
corporate interest entities, which use the measures in a regressive like manner.132 Broder 
argues that these proposals have inspired massive sums of money from special interest 
backers with deep pockets creating what some refer to as the initiative industry, where 
financers help proposals gain support on the state level to implement changes they 
support.133 This in turn, bypasses many of the checks and balances that were intended for 
the state governments, primarily between state legislatures and governors. At a book 
forum in 2000 he stated that the Founders were more intent on protecting freedom than 
on guaranteeing government efficiency, and did not include balot initiatives for specific 
reasons. He argued that: 
They wanted to be very sure that minority rights, including property rights were  
protected. And they wanted to be very sure that, before a new statute was enacted 
there was a genuine consensus in society that the law was needed. Most of those 
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checks and balances, except for the final step of judicial review are missing from 
the initiative process. 134 
 
In his research he found that during the 1998 election cycle, $250 milion was spent on 
balot measures at the state level. This is $100 milion more than was given to the three 
presidential candidates at the same time by taxpayers, and shows just how significant, 
money-driven and politicized balot initiatives have become since 1978.135 
This question of checks and balances associated with balot measures is also 
addressed by Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miler in Dangerous Democracy?: The Batle over 
Balot Initiatives in America. They argue that instead of threatening existing checks and 
balances, referendums actualy complement them by alowing approval or rejection by 
the people at the balot box to enhance the checks already in efect by legislatures and 
governors.136 However, Cain and Miler as wel as other scholarly works, agree with 
Broder that initiatives do weaken checks and balances and in essence undermine the 
representative government.137 They argue that it limits a state legislature’s ability to set 
and pursue policy agendas and ultimately make hard decisions, creating an alternative to 
representative government.138 Where a proper democratic system ofers opportunities for 
refinement, consensus building, compromise and informed deliberation on legislation, 
initiatives do not. Initiatives do not go through the process of commitee hearings, 
briefings, town hal events and constituent’s contacting their elected representatives. 
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Likewise, they do not have to have another house of a state’s legislature to review it, 
ofer potential alternatives and then reconcile them in a conference commitee. Finaly, 
they do not have to go before a governor for a final approval or veto. Cain and Miler also 
explain how the expertise ofered to representatives by specialized stafers, lobbyists and 
others provide proficient analysis that private citizens voting on an initiative balot 
generaly do not have.139 
 Other scholarly works take a contrasting view of the issue, supporting balot 
measures as a way to enhance government in the United States. Dane Waters, founder 
and co-chairman of the Initiative and Referendum Institute at the University of Southern 
California, sees the initiative process as vital to reform. Waters and like-minded 
researchers see balot measures as an efective tool to curb the power and often ineptitude 
of state legislatures, and the reason why many politicians are introducing legislation that 
would limit their role. While Broder sees the initiative industry as unregulated, Waters 
asserts that it is one of the most regulated systems of balot measures in the world.140 As 
highlighted earlier, the proposal process that states require for balot initiatives and 
referendums varies from state to state with each having their own specific guidelines. 
They vary from what specific issues proposals can be brought forward on, the size and 
font of petitions, how many signatures are needed, deadlines, and many more details. He 
argues that the money going towards these measures from the initiative industry makes a 
meniscal impact when compared to the amount of initiatives being introduced that are not 
being promoted by special interests. While 40% of al initiatives that were placed on 
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balots in California from 1986 to 1996 passed, only 14% of those passed had special 
interest support.141 
 Waters and other scholars who support balot measures view them as an 
additional check on state governments, essentialy replacing the original check of 
elections and alowing citizens to promote a specific view on one issue without having to 
vote against a representative they support who may oppose it.142 From the 
implementation of balot measures to the year 2000, roughly 800 laws went into efect 
through the initiative process.143 Considering most state legislatures pass around 1,000 
laws per year, scholars of this persuasion do not see them as an overwhelming threat.144 
They view them rather as a complement to representative government, balancing state 
legislature’s inefectiveness to often react when needed on one singular issue. 
Evidence and Methods of Analysis  
This study wil look at examples of balot measures from across the United States. 
As mentioned earlier, it wil build upon previous research in examining how financial 
funding for corporate or special interest backed proposals compares across the history of 
the mechanisms, and determine whether that is a valid threat to the capabilities and 
function of state legislatures. Examining a wide cross section of these balot measures, 
and their impact post-enactment wil also alow for a beter understanding of the 
capabilities for direct government possessed by constituents.  
Poling data associated with the level of understanding voters have towards 
various initiatives and referendums wil help ilustrate whether the general public has the 
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intelectual premise and ingenuity to fuly understand a proposal’s impact before casting 
a vote. Proposition 13 in California for example, showed that 38% of voters did not think 
that the proposal would have any impact on state services or the size of government. 
After it was enacted however, $6 bilion in annual revenue from local governments 
disappeared, and the state legislature in Sacramento had to cut funding and services for 
basic health, education and welfare programs.145 
As with the previous studies, this paper wil use the term “state legislature” as the 
generic term for al state-level legislative bodies within the United States. While a 
majority of states do refer to their legislative bodies as state legislatures, there are several 
who use the terms general assemblies or courts. Regardless, al state legislative branches 
wil be refered to as state legislatures throughout these findings. This research also uses 
the term balot measures as an al-encompassing term for both balot initiatives and 
referendums. It is used to describe any measure placed on a balot in which voters can use 
a popular vote to decide upon a new proposal or legislatively passed law.  
Results 
In the colection of research on initiatives presented in Dangerous Democracy?: 
The Batle over Balot Initiatives in America, researcher Howard Ernst of the U.S. Naval 
Academy examined a comparison of usage and passage rates of initiatives across the 
three periods of time comparing the four potential outcomes of proposals supported or 
opposed by special/corporate interests and proposals supported or opposed by a non-
special/corporate interest. The study involved looking at statewide initiative campaigns in 
the United States from 1898 to 1995. This information refers to special/corporate 
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Table 7 - Support and Opposition in Initiatives146 
 
interest campaigns as atempts to secure or protect material rewards for a select group in 
society.147 Those classified as other, or non-special/corporate interest, do not exhibit 
identifiable, narow interests at stake (see Table 7).148 He concluded that there are 
striking similarities across al three-time periods in terms of success rates and usage rates 
(See Table 8).149 This ideology counters Broder’s argument, and the notion that corporate 
executives are using unlimited finances, political consultants, direct-mail firms, television 
campaigns, and an army of paid signature gatherers to manipulate public sentiment to 
their benefit.150 This study and similar scholarly works suggest that the fear of corporate 
influence on balot measures has been overstated, indicating that initiatives supported by 
non-special/corporate interests historicaly have similar or higher passage rates than those 
of special interests. 
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Table 8 - Use and Passage Rates of Initiatives151 
 
In Ernst’s study, the recent period since Proposition 13 actualy appears very 
similar to the earlier periods, with passage rates being highest at 60.7% in groups where 
balot initiatives consisted of opposing sides with neither group being represented by a 
labor or corporate interest.152 The lowest passage rate in the recent period was when a 
balot initiative was supported by a labor or corporate interest group, and opposed by 
another a non-labor or corporate group, with a 45% passage rate.153 Ernst acknowledges 
that the cultivation of the initiative industry since Proposition 13 and the absence of party 
identification, name recognition, and other voting heuristics are likely to have fostered 
financial-backed special interests unfavorably in the process. However, his findings 
conclude that this ideology has been exaggerated, with labor or corporate interest group 
supported positions on initiatives actualy having less success when compared to those 
involving citizen-oriented groups.154 Resource advantages appear to not have been that 
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much of a factor, with special interest backed positions working at a disadvantage in 
initiative measures. 
As the issues covered by balot measures have changed in the modern period, the 
special interest’s involvement in them has not. It also appears that just because initiatives 
do garner strong financial backing, they are not guaranteed to win, nor guaranteed that 
they are the only ones capable of creating a negative impression on a state or state 
legislature. A 1993 balot initiative in Washington State nicknamed the “three-strikes, 
you’re out” initiative mandated that three-time convicted felons be put behind bars for 
life without parole.155 The measure did not have support from a labor or corporate interest 
group, but rather powerful rhetoric that spread through the state, igniting senses of 
emotion rather than facts. The initiative became law with a 75% majority because of the 
perception that felons were roaming the streets endangering the public.156 Measures such 
as these erode functions of the judicial branch and the role that judges play in considering 
evidence and circumstances when passing sentences. The same is also true for 
government functions in other capacities. If initiatives are put forward for voters that ask 
questions such as “should a criminal be put away for repeat ofensives” or “should taxes 
be kept low,” the results are predictable without basis on research, facts, or the financial 
needs and constraint of the state. This hinders state legislature’s ability to do their job, by 
having to account for the possibility that whatever issues they address may either be 
countered by a balot measure, or by forcing them to deal with budget constraints or other 
limits because of enacted initiatives.  
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Balot measures place the responsibility of learning about an issue on constituents, 
without any type of oversight or accountability to ensure they have the facts, as is the 
case with state legislatures. The general public only has 30-second commercials, bumper 
stickers, and questionable endorsements to help formulate their opinions, unless they 
aggressively seek out the facts.157 This “voter incompetence” alows proposals, which 
could do considerable harm to a state’s economy, business, or civil liberties, to be passed 
without a ful understanding. A Nevada balot measure dealing with education for 
example, is coming up for a vote this November, and wil decide if a business margins 
tax wil be levied that is estimated to raise $800 milion a year for public education. The 
money however, is not guaranteed for education, and could be spent elsewhere if the state 
legislature deems necessary.158 Voters likely do not have al of the information like 
Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval, who opposes the amendment since state education 
spending per student is expected to increase under new budgets from $5,376 in 2012 to 
$5,676 by the fal of 2014.159 Despite that however, a pol conducted by the Retail 
Association of Nevada showed that the Education Initiative would likely pass with a slim 
majority. However, when the pol explained how the tax could impact business across the 
state by losing money, with no guarantee it would go to education, support fel to roughly 
40%.160 
Balot measures also create opportunities for legislators to defer to popular votes, 
rather than addressing issues within their hals or by gubernatorial review. In North 
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Carolina, a 2012 legislatively refered constitutional amendment known as Amendment 1 
was accepted by popular vote with roughly 61% approving.161 The Amendment made it 
unconstitutional for the state of North Carolina to recognize or perform any same-sex 
mariages or civil unions. The language of the amendment as it was proposed and enacted 
to the state constitution reads: 
Article XIV, Section 6: Mariage between one man and one woman is the only 
domestic legal union that shal be valid or recognized in the State. This section 
does not prohibit a private party from entering into contracts with another private 
party; nor does this section prohibit courts from adjudication the rights of private 
parties pursuant to such contracts.162 
 
North Carolina had already passed a state law in the legislature’s 1995-1996 session, 
which defined same-sex mariages performed in or outside of North Carolina as being not 
valid.163 Studies into the proposed legislative referendum found that its impacts were far 
more impactful than just same-sex mariage. The broad phrase “only domestic legal 
union” has already shown that it could impact the treatment of domestic-violence 
protections for unmaried people, adoption and child-visitation protections, and threaten 
same and opposite-sex couples and their children from receiving partner employment 
benefits.164 A pol done by Public Policy Poling a few weeks before the measure came to 
a vote, found that only 40% of North Carolinians knew that the amendment would ban 
both same-sex mariage and civil unions.165 Those who knew what the amendment would 
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do both socialy and economicaly were against it by a 60% to 38% margin.166 The 
amendment received major backlash from companies across North Carolina, who 
immediately began implementing protection policies to prevent the discrimination of both 
same and opposite sex couples afected by this amendment in their employment, 
especialy benefits such as health care.167 
 Amendment 1 received a majority vote in 92 of North Carolina’s 100 counties.168 
While some supporters in those areas may have known of the overarching impact in the 
language of the amendment, it is safe to say based of of poling data that the majority did 
not. The constitutional referendum was placed on the balot after Republicans took 
control of the state legislature for the first time in 140 years, creating a way for their party 
to use direct democracy as a way to confront voters with a topic covered in powerful 
rhetoric, which was capable of overshadowing al of the adverse efects the proposal 
enacted.169 
Granted, there are examples of balot initiatives that do garner majority support 
and opposition where constituents voting do understand the measure, and its impact. It 
should be noted however, that such measures, which are supported based on merit and 
fact, could just as easily be brought before state legislatures at the behest of 
constituencies who can demonstrate the public support for the proposed legislation. A 
failure to act on these sentiments by their elected representatives in the state legislatures 
would most certainly impact their reelection chances, and signify the functionality of the 
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democratic process. One of the original purposes of balot measures was to counter what 
was seen as rampant coruption in state legislatures in the early 20th Century. Balot 
measures, the 17th Amendment, and other actions were instituted in several states and 
nationaly as way to create more accountability. However, in today’s world where 
technology and the 24-hour news cycle have created a naturaly evolving deterence for 
politicians, there has become less of a need for such implementations. The modern age of 
balot measures have proven to create nothing but an extra step in the legislative process 
that gambles on the comprehension of the voting public. 
Three-term Missouri State Representative Stephen Webber is one of the many 
elected oficials who recognize the impediments balot measures create for state 
legislatures, but also the waste of time that addressing them consumes. In an interview 
Representative Webber stated, “We’ve also had the Missouri State Legislature go in and 
over turn balot initiatives prety frequently. So if a balot initiative passes, and the state 
legislature disagrees with what it does, we’ve commonly had to go in the next session of 
congress and work to change or overturn it.”170 Not only does it appear that it creates 
constraints for legislatures to work within, but also requires these bodies to spend time 
working on added agenda items. Representative Webber also added, “We have a 
Democratic governor and a Republican legislature, so the Republican legislature has 
started using the referendum as a way to go around the governor because it doesn’t 
require the bil to be signed. It’s essentialy a tool to achieve an end.”171 
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Conclusion 
This research concludes that the initiative industry associated with balot 
measures has not had any more of an adverse impact on state legislatures in the modern 
era than in the previous time periods. Additionaly, examination of various balot 
initiatives and referendums reveal that there is a distinct inadequacy on the citizenry in 
terms of a complete understanding of proposals and their impacts. This analysis reveals 
that balot initiatives and popular referendums place state legislatures in a distinct 
disadvantage, in which they are placed at the behest of voters who do not have access to 
the same research, resources, hearings and an overal understanding of complex 
legislation and policy. These in turn impact a state legislature’s ability to efectively plan 
budgets, appropriations and programs for their state’s fiscal year. It also creates an 
opportunity for state legislatures to essentialy defer to a popular vote on issues that might 
be seen as too controversial for them. As mentioned in the findings, where state 
legislatures have a wide aray of research and investigative capabilities, the voting public 
tends to rely much more on opinionated rhetoric and limited research to base decisions. 
This creates an opportunity for state legislators to use legislative referendums to place 
responsibility for an issue on a public they know wil ultimately vote accordingly. It also 
provides for a legislative pathway around gubernatorial review, where a legislature 
controled by one party can efectively sidestep potential veto action taken by a governor 
who disagrees with them.  
Future research on this subject can look more deeply into state’s budgets and any 
possible fluctuation in terms of appropriations and funding for various social programs 
before and after the 1978 passage of Proposition 13. Since this period serves as the 
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fundamental changing point of balot measures towards becoming a modern political tool, 
it wil likely provide additional insight into exactly how much has changed for 
legislatures over this period. While the initiative industry itself wil not have played more 
of a role than in previous periods, the increase of balot measures combined with the 
proven ineptitude of the public to understand the lingering impact of such legislation 
would be interesting to examine.  
Future studies could also look at how budgets and appropriations in states with 
balot initiatives and popular referendums compares to states with similar demographics 
that do not employ them. This wil further the understanding of their impact, and create a 
beter visual for the capacity of state legislatures to function both with and without the 
influence of popularly elected legislation. It would also be interesting to hear from 
legislators in states without balot initiatives and popular referendums to see if they feel 
their implementation would fil some type of void or need that no longer exists in states 
with the measures.  
This research has helped establish how balot initiatives impede the functionality 
of state legislatures by relying on public sentiment often based more on opinion than 
facts. While the role of balot measure financing did not play as big a role in this impact 
as expected, it is clearly evident that modern initiatives and referendums do create 
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Portfolio Conclusion 
As this study is being writen, the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a ful-time 
legislature, is in a partisan batle over pension reform. It has placed the Governor of 
Pennsylvania in a position where he has felt obligated to cut a fifth of the legislature’s 
alowance to incentivize them to address the issue, which has been staled by partisan 
bickering.172 The North Carolina General Assembly is debating how to find solutions for 
coal ash disposal in the wake of a major spil into the Dan River in early 2014. After 
much debate, the legislature has moved forward on a bil that many are caling 
inadequate. The Coal Ash Management Plan of 2014 (SB729) is seen by many, including 
legislators who fought extensively to improve the bil, as not doing enough to ensure 
those responsible for spils and contaminations are held responsible.173 Representative 
Pricey Harison from Guilford County, NC summed up her views stating, “We could and 
should have done beter for the citizens of North Carolina.”174 Furthermore, protests 
aimed at state legislatures continue to be prevalent, alowing citizens exhausted by 
partisan politics legislative shortcomings to express their concerns. In March 2014, 
protestors in Florida converged on the Florida Legislature to protest the state’s ‘Stand 
Your Ground’ law. The law gained national atention in the wake of the death of Trayvon 
Martin in 2012, with many upset that the Florida legislature has stil not taken any action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Jan Murphy, “Corbet Wants General Assembly to Send Him Meaningful Pension Reform Before Signing the 
Budget,” Penn Live, July 1, 2014, 
htp:/www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2014/07/corbet_wants_general_assembly.html. 
173 Amy Adams, “Environmental Community Cals For Major Changes To North Carolina House’s Coal Ash Bil, “ 
Appalachian Voices, July 1, 2014, htp:/appvoices.org/2014/07/01/environmental-community-cals-for-major-changes-
to-north-carolina-houses-coal-ash-bil/. 
174 North Carolina League of Conservation Voters, “Not Good Enough on Coal Ash,” June 6, 2014, 
htp:/nclcv.org/news/cib/20140707/.	  
	   	   	  
	   84	  
to address the public’s concerns.175 Just as with the case of Arizona Senate Bil 1062 in 
the introduction of this thesis, these types of partisan politics and inactions for social 
change have been a driving force throughout the history of the United States for 
legislative reforms aimed at state legislatures. 
This thesis finds that these reforms and measures taken to limit a legislature’s 
authority, and sometimes increase that of the people, often come with unintended 
ramifications. Chapter one examined how term limits on state representatives can 
strengthen a governor’s legislative reach. Chapter two analyzed the modern perception of 
the 17th Amendment, and how it impacts the functionality of state legislatures today. 
Chapter three looked closely at balot initiatives and referendums to see how they 
influence the legislatures’ role. The findings of each chapter ilustrates that there is not 
uniformity in the impact of reforms to the role of state legislatures. While restructuring 
the role of the legislatures does influence their capabilities to a certain extent, in some 
situations it inadvertently alows the members of these bodies to more efectively 
translate the wishes and needs of their constituents into public policy. On the other hand, 
the efect can be harmful to their ability to efectively cary out their duty, threatening 
their constitutionaly defined role and exhausting limited time and resources. This 
conclusion wil analyze the findings of the three previous chapters, make suggestions for 
future studies that should be taken into account, and make recommendations for how 
reforms to state legislatures should be evaluated and monitored. 
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Chapter 1 – Findings and Suggestions for Future Studies on Term Limits 
 The first chapter examined the impact of term limits on state legislatures, and the 
impact they have on the legislative-executive relationship in a state. As the United States 
moved into the 1990s, confronting “Congressional Homesteading” and the extremely 
high reelection rates of incumbents became a major focus, leading to the development of 
the Term Limits Movement.176 By utilizing balot initiatives and referendums, citizens 
were able to have term limits put on twenty-one state legislatures, fifteen of which are 
stil in efect.177 Today, term limits continue to be very popular with a recent pol 
showing that 75% of Americans would even like to see them placed on federal 
lawmakers.178 
 Term limits have greatly afected the balance between legislatures and governors, 
by tilting the level of experience towards the executive branch. The rotation of term-
limited legislators causes members to not gain the much-needed experience and 
involvement necessary to build strong party leadership. This impacts the expertise of 
commitee chairs and members, increases the number of rank-and-file legislators, and 
influences one of the main roles of state legislatures, executive oversight. Governors and 
their stafs, who presumably have been involved in politics on the state level for a longer 
period of time, wil have a significant legislative advantage over cycled representatives in 
regards to proposed budgets and policy. 
 However, there is no indication that the removal of experience in the legislative 
branch and a presumed increase in capability by the executive threatens the economic 
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stability of a state. Examining economic indicators, such as state population, bond debt, 
unemployment rates and others for the states with term limits both prior to and after their 
impact, reveals that term limits have not had any direct impact on economies. Similarly, a 
comparative study between North Dakota (no term limits) to South Dakota (term limits), 
both of which have comparable demographics, could not distinguish any distinctive 
oscilations after South Dakota’s impact year, 2000. This rejected this chapter’s original 
hypothesis, which expected to see distinct variations in economic indicators associated 
with the years folowing term limits impact on a state. Chapter one findings ilustrate a 
definite shift in power away from legislatures controled by term limits; however, it does 
not appear that this increased gubernatorial power significantly increases influence on a 
state’s economy.  
 As mentioned in the chapter, future research wil be able to have a beter 
observation of the long-term impact of term limits on state legislatures. This study is 
using data from states that in some cases are just a few years removed from their term 
limit impact year. This limits the larger view of their influence on state legislatures and 
economic development, and wil be able to be beter viewed in the future. Future studies 
should also look into the budget requests made by governors both before and after the 
impact of term limits to see how if an increase in legislative power changes the way 
requests are shaped. While this study looked at economic indicators to understand 
development, future studies could certainly include specific aspects of budgets in which 
requests and the amount enacted could be compared before and after term limits. 
 Future studies should also look at how term limits on governors afect this 
relationship. Today, thirty-six states have term limits on their gubernatorial ofices, 
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including al fifteen of the states with legislative term limits.179 Gubernatorial term limits 
vary in length and reelection capabilities, and could influence their utilization of 
legislative authority. Acknowledging how the diferent variations of term limits on 
legislatures and governors interelate with one another wil develop a beter 
understanding of shifts in power within these state’s executive-legislative relationship. 
Chapter 2 – Findings and Suggestions for Future Studies on the 17th Amendment 
Chapter two looked at the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, focusing 
specificaly on how the views of curent state legislators, and how they feel the 
Amendment might impact citizen involvement in their state legislatures. When the 
Constitution was originaly ratified, it created the Senate as the representative of the 
states on the federal level, with U.S. senators being appointed by state legislatures. The 
Amendment was ratified in 1913 and mandated that al U.S. senators be elected by a 
popular vote.180 Many citizens had supported this change since the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 for two distinct reasons. Up until 1913, there had been a noticeable 
amount of unfiled seats in the U.S. Senate, thanks to indecisive legislatures. Delaware 
for example, had been unable to elect U.S. senators from March 1899 to March 1903.181 
The second reason was coruption associated with filing the posts. There were many 
incidences across the nation involving claims that bribery was used by legislators to pay 
of state representatives in order to be elected.  
The research in this chapter looked at the views and thoughts of state 
representatives of diverse political ideologies and examined previous research to see how 
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political figures feel the Amendment inhibits the function of state legislatures. It was 
hypothesized state legislators would view the 17th Amendment as limiting the ful 
potential of legislatures, both by taking away their impact of the federal level, and 
creating a detachment between them and constituent interest in their state legislatures 
with this loss of power. While there were variations in the research as to the extent that 
individuals support the 17th Amendment, there seems to be agreement between 
Democrats and moderate Republicans that the 17th Amendment has a necessary impact 
on the function of state legislatures. Interviews with curent state representatives yielded 
similar results as wel. Both Republicans and Democrats viewed the 17th Amendment as a 
type of political bufer, which alowed them to conduct their business without the veil of 
major campaign financing and special interests being on them.  
This agreement was observed from legislators from various states and 
backgrounds, who felt that were the 17th Amendment not in efect and the duty of 
electing state senators stil theirs, state legislatures would be even more partisan and 
divided, resembling their federal counterparts even more. As one representative infered, 
the 17th Amendment “alows things to actualy get done in the states…” Combined with 
research into previous works and interviews conducted, this study concluded that modern 
support for repeal or reform of the 17th Amendment is primarily supported by those on 
the extreme right of the political spectrum. Furthermore, the most adamant supports of 
repeal tend to be extremely conservative individuals who play a role on the federal level, 
not in state legislatures. Today, Republicans control twenty-seven state legislatures, 
which means that were the 17th Amendment not in place, at least fifty-four and a majority 
control seats in the Senate would belong to the GOP. Those who support repeal do so as a 
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political maneuver to help gain Republican legislative control on the federal level, rather 
than over concerns with the function of state legislatures. 
As pointed out in chapter two, this study was inhibited by the dificulty in 
findings voter turnout records in state elections in the forty-five applicable states during 
state legislative elections before and after the 17th Amendment was ratified. Future 
studies could certainly delve deeper into records kept by state houses to see if a more 
accurate picture of voter turnout in this period can be drawn. This would ilustrate any 
variation that exists amongst states, and how that corelates with the votes to ratify the 
amendment. Future studies should also expand upon the interviews with North Carolina 
and other state representatives, to get an even beter understanding of curent state 
legislator views regarding the 17th Amendment. This expansion on the interviews in this 
study would also help solidify the conclusion that only extreme conservatives support the 
overturn of the 17th Amendment.  
Chapter 3 – Findings and Suggestions for Future Studies on Balot Measures 
The final chapter looked at the impact of initiatives and referendums on state 
legislators, and if they inhibit their role. The argument over balot measures is a 
continuation of one that has been happening in this nation since it’s beginning. Direct 
versus representative democracy, and the role that elected oficials should play in that 
were at the core of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist’s arguments. Since California’s 
Proposition 13 passed in 1978, many scholars have argued that the initiative industry has 
grown into a business ran by special interest money.182 These individuals argue that while 
labor or corporate interest are alowed to benefit from political consultants, direct-mail 
firms, television campaigns, and an army of paid signature gatherers to manipulate public 
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sentiment towards their cause on balot measures, the general public is unfairly placed at 
a disadvantages for causes they may support.  
This study examined research conducted by Howard Ernst to view the progression 
of corporate interest backed measures over the three key periods of balot initiatives in 
the United States. Ernst breaks down al the initiatives in these periods and whether they 
consisted of proposals supported or opposed by corporate interests and proposals 
supported or opposed by non-corporate interest, creating four possible parings.183 In his 
results we can discern that there were striking similarities across al three periods in terms 
of success rates and usage rates for the four possible pairings. In fact, since Proposition 
13 the highest passage rate for balot initiatives were in the pairing where neither side 
was represented by a labor or corporate interest. This study concludes from this that the 
perception of the initiatives industry since 1978, and the role that special financing plays 
in it has been vastly overstated.184 
Chapter three also looked at several specific balot initiatives and referendums 
from around the United States to gain an understanding of citizen engagement in the 
process. Findings suggest that there is an inadequacy on behalf of the citizenry to become 
knowledgeable of the issues they are voting on. Poling data from specific examples 
ilustrate a clear ignorance on their part as to the ful impact of potential legislation. This 
has a lingering impact on state legislatures as wel, who have to plan budgets, handle 
appropriations, and empower programs while also accounting for any adverse efects 
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from balot measures. It is likely that Alexander Hamilton foresaw this issue in his 1788 
speech before the Convention of New York, in which he stated: 
It has been observed by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it were 
practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proven that no 
position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the 
people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. 
Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity. When they assembled, 
the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable of 
deliberation, but prepared for every enormity.185 
 
 Legislatures must also use limited time and resources in subsequent legislative sessions 
corecting the negative impacts of policies enacted through these measures. It is also 
concluded that referendums create opportunities for state legislatures to avoid 
gubernatorial review of an issue, and place the responsibility for approval on the 
citizenry, rather than perform their legislative duty.  
Future research should build upon this study by examining how state budgets and 
appropriations have been impacted in states where balot initiatives and popular 
referendums are alowed, specificaly examining social programs before and after 1978. 
Analysis of specific programs would highlight any downward trends in terms of 
legislative support or opposition that might have stemmed from balot measures. States 
should also look at how these changes to budgets and programs compare to other states 
with similar demographics that do not employ specific balot measures. This would help 
ilustrate the capacity of state legislatures to function efectively both with and without 
the threat of balot initiatives and popular referendums. 
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Recommendations 
There are not many indications that the partisanship and voter dissatisfaction of 
state legislatures, just like the national level, is going to change any time soon. Public 
disapproval of state legislatures remains high, with bodies like that of California 
maintaining a disapproval rating with likely voters in the 50-60% range.186 As this 
dissatisfaction continues between constituents and state legislatures it wil be interesting 
to see if voters in various states pursue an expansion of state or federal limitations on the 
function of state legislatures examined here, or new measures. Regardless, this study has 
proven that there are unintended consequences associated with these restrictions to the 
authority and power of state legislatures. It is essential that the citizenry and state 
legislatures examine measures closely prior to and after their implementation to ensure 
that legislatures are not being treated unfairly, or being limited in their constitutional 
duty.  
While some measures, such as the 17th Amendment, can actualy help legislatures 
perform their function to a much greater extent, others are not so forgiving. Term limits 
and balot measures can create extra hurdles for legislatures to deal with, limiting their 
function beyond the initial intent. Commitees in state legislatures who focus on the rules 
and operations of their body need to be much more proactive in monitoring the impact of 
such measures. Hearings and studies similar to this one should be commissioned to 
explore deeper into their impact and inadvertent limitations they create which could 
negatively impact the state as a whole. State Supreme Courts need to monitor these 
reforms as wel, to ensure that they adhere to a state’s Constitution. In the case of term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Public Policy Institute of California, “Job Approval Ratings for California State Legislature,” 2014, 
htp:/www.ppic.org/main/dataSet.asp?i=927. 
	   	   	  
	   93	  
limits for example, several state Supreme Courts saw fit to strike down initiatives limiting 
the amount of years representatives could serve. 
As previously mentioned, this is not a new debate in the United States. The role of 
representation in our democracy, and the extent to which self-determination plays into 
that, has been a point of contention since the nation was founded. As citizens continue to 
become disgruntled with the inefectiveness of their state legislatures, reforms and 
changes to the range of their power may very wel be necessary. As Madison said in 
Federalist 49, “…the people are the only legitimate fountain of power…” Nevertheless, 
this is not an admission for reform to an extent of complete direct democracy. Measures 
limiting control of state legislatures must be monitored to ensure that unintended, 
negative impacts on the role of legislators, the people, and each state’s welfare are 
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